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COMMENTS
TITLE VII-THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES As A DEFENSE To PRI
VATE PLAINTIFF TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964

to

eliminate employment discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin. I To accomplish these goals, Congress created
the United

States

Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC)2 to investigate charges of unlawful employment practices and
I. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat.
241,253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. 1987».
Congress' objective in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to achieve
equal employment opportunities and to remove artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barri
ers that in the past operated to favor some groups of employees over others. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). Consequently, by virtue of the major sub
stantive prohibitions of § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), Title VII of the Act provides,
with respect to employers, that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em
ployer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis
, criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportuniti~ or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). The Act also prohibits discriminatory conduct by employ
ment agencies and labor unions. Id. at § 2000e-2(b), (c).
2. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4(a) (1982). The EEOC is designed to eliminate discriminatory
employment practices by certain employers, unions and employment agencies. Under Title
VII, the EEOC is charged with preventing employers from engaging in any unlawful em
ployment practice set forth in specific provisions of Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(a). Generally,
the EEOC's powers are twofold. First, the EEOC is empowered to receive and investigate
charges of discrimination in employment; and second, if it determines that reasonable cause
exists to believe that a cliarge is true, the EEOC is empowered to attempt through concilia
tion and persuasion to resolve disputes involving such charges. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
In addition, the EEOC has the power to issue, amend or rescind suitable procedural
regulatioris to cOarry out the provisions of Title VII. Id. § 2000e-12(a). These EEOC proce
dural regulations may be found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1-.80 (1988 & Supp. 1989). Specifi
cally, the EEOC has promulgated interpretive regulations on discrimination because of sex,
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to bring about voluntary settlement of employment discrimination
claims. 3 In addition to creating the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Congress created a private right of action in the party
who alleges employment discrimination. 4
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII by passing the Equal Em
ployment Opportunity Act. 5 Among other changes, 6 the amendment
religion, national origin, and employee selection procedures. Id. §§ 1604-1607 (1988). In
addition, EEOC procedures regarding recordkeeping and reports can be found at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1602 (1988). These regulations have largely been accepted by the courts as definitive with
respect to the issues to which they address themselves. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) ("The EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission, hav
ing enforcement responsibility, has issued guidelines .... The administrative interpretation
of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference."). See also Meritor Sav
ings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 74 n.28,
79 n.36 (1984); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761 (1979); General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
431 (1975); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (Interpretative regulations,
"while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."); EEOC v. Texas Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1986).
3. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(a), (b) (1982). There are two methods for instituting an ad
ministrative proceeding before the EEOC. First, a person claiming to be aggrieved may file
a charge in writing and under oath. Id. § 2000e-5(b). Second, a member of the EEOC who
has reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred may file a written charge made
under oath. Id.
4. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). Any person whom the charge alleges was ag
grieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice may bring a private action against the
person or employer alleged to have violated Title VII. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I)
provides:
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission, or if
within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge ... the Com
mission has not filed a civil action ... , or the Commission has not entered into a
conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission
... shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of
such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the
charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved . . . .
Id.
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716,78
Stat. 241, 253-66, and codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 &
Supp. 1987».
6. Title VII, as originally enacted in 1964, afforded a remedy for employment dis
crimination only to employees in the private sector. The 1972 amendment expanded cover
age to employees of state and local governments, as well as to employees of the federal
government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-a (1982). In addition, the 1972 amendment increased Title
VII coverage to businesses with fifteen or more employees, whereas only businesses with
twenty-five or more employees were covered prior to the amendment. Id. § 2000e-b (1982
& Supp. 1987).
With respect to federal employees, the 1972 amendment added section 717. This sec
tion requires that "[a]ll [federal] personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment ... be made free from any. discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
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empowered the EEOC to bring an action against the employer in a
federal district court. 7 The employee's private right to sue, originally
created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was retained in the 1972 ActS
and, even today, continues to be one of the "most important enforce
ment mechanism[s] in Title VII."9
Under the Act, as amended, private claimants are entitled to
prompt processing of their charge by the EEOC. 10 In fact, the legisla
tive history of Title VII establishes that it is appropriate for the indi
vidual to pursue a private action when delay is occasioned by the
inefficiencies of the administrative agency. 11 Section 706(f)(1) of Title
VII, however, permits the claimant to await the termination of EEOC
proceedings before filing suit and does not impose any maximum time
period within which the EEOC must conclude its administrative pro
ceedings and conciliation efforts.12
In the absence of such a statutory limitation on a Title VII claim
ant's right to await the conclusion of EEOC action, courts have con
sidered whether equitable principles may be applied to protect Title
VII defendants who have been prejudiced because of an unreasonable
national origin." Id. § 2000e-16 (1982). This new section also gives anyone who has filed a
charge of discrimination against a federal agency the right to sue the agency in federal
court under § 706 if the charge has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the charging
party within one hundred and eighty days. Id. § 2000e-16(c), (d).
7. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). The 1972 amendment provided that "[i]fwithin
thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission ... the Commission has been unable
to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the
Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent ... named in the charge." Id.
8. Under the Act, a private party may bring an action if the EEOC dismisses the
employment discrimination charge, enters into an unacceptable conciliation agreement, or
does not act upon the charge within one hundred and eighty days. Id. If the EEOC fails to
act within the 180-day period, it must notify the complainant, who then has the option of
filing a private suit within ninety days after receiving such notice, or awaiting completion of
the EEOC's administration of the charge. Id. See supra note 4 for the text of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(I) which provides for a private right of action in a party who alleges employ
ment discrimination.
9. 21 AM. JUR. TRIALS Employment Discrimination § 4, at 19 (1974).
10. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2148.
11. Id. Under Title VII, Congress provides an aggrieved person the opportunity to
bring an independent action against the respondent if the EEOC has not issued a notice of
right to sue within one hundred and eighty days. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). "The
committee believes that aggrieved persons are entitled to have their cases processed
promptly ... [t]he primary concern must be protection of the aggrieved person's option to
seek a prompt remedy in the best manner available." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2148.
12. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). For the text of 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I), see
supra note 4.
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or inexcusable delay by the claimant in filing an action.13 These courts
have ruled, under certain circumstances, that the equitable doctrine of
laches l4 may be applied as a time limitation on a Title VII claimant's
right to bring suit. 15 Specifically, where courts find inexcusable and
unreasonable delay in seeking a remedy, and prejudice to the defend
ant by the passage of time, 16 the defense of laches has been successfully
applied to bar a Title VII claim. 17
This comment addresses the specific question of whether the equi
table doctrine of laches might bar a private plaintiff's Title VII em
ployment discrimination action, when the claimant has timely filed
charges as required under section 706,18 but, before filing suit, has cho
13. A court of equity may refuse relief to one who has been .dilatory !)r wa'1ting ill
diligence in prosecuting a cause of action. See Urquhart v. McDonald, 252 Ala. 505, 509,
42 So. 2d 9, 13 (1949).
14. The maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights,
expresses the concept which is fundamental to the doctrine of laches. See New York City
v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93, 98 (1902); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto In~. Co. v. Houle: 118 Vt. 154,
159, 102 A.2d 326, 329 (1954). The basis of the doctrine of laches is said to be public
policy, which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale demands. See,
e.g., Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 566 (1890); Davidson v. Grady, 105 F.2d 405, 408
(5th Cir. 1939); Denison v. McCann, 303 Ky. 195, 198, 197 S.W.2d 248, 249 (1946); Wil
helm v. Pfinning, 191 Okla. 321, 323, 129 P.2d 580, 582 (1942). The doctrine is based on
the injustice of allowing recovery where no explanation is given for unreasonable and inju
rious delay, and is based, in part, on the injustice that might result from the enforcement of
a neglected right or claim. See City of Paducah v. Gillispie, 273 Ky. 101, 104, 115 S.W.2d
574, 575 (1938); O'Grady v. Deery, 94 N.H. 5, 7-8, 45 A.2d 295, 297 (1946).
15. See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local 1 v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,
839 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1987); Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69 (3d
Cir. 1986); Jeffries V. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1050 (1986); Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1985); Howard V.
Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984); Rozen v. District of Columbia,
702 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th
Cir. 1979); Bernard V. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89
(1981).
16. In equity a party is not permitted to sleep on a right of action to the prejudice of
the party against whom a claim is made, and who by the delay may be deprived of the
evidence and means of making an effective defense. See supra notes 13-14. A demand must
be made within a reasonable time, otherwise the claim is considered stale, and courts of
equity have refused to aid stale demands where the party has acquiesced for a great length
of time. See, e.g., Urquhart V. McDonald, 252 Ala. 505, 509, 42 So. 2d 9, 13 (1949); Samp
son v. Cottongim, 249 Ky. 670, 671, 61 S.W.2d 309,310 (1933); Burns v. Dillon, 226 Ky.
82,88,9 S.W.2d 1095,1098 (1928). See also Lorenz V. Rowley, 122 Vt. 480, 485,177 A.2d
364, 368 (1962).
17. See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Jeffries V. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676, 680-82 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). For the text of 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1), see
supra note 4.
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sen to await the conclusion of extended EEOC proceedings. Consider
ation of this issue must address two competing concerns which
provide the major background for this comment. First, the concern
for the Title VII claimant's statutory right to await the termination of
EEOC proceedings before initiating a suit in federal court and the leg
islative policy reflected in Title VII which favors the administrative
resolution of claims by the EEOC must be examined. Second, the in
terest in limiting prejudice and inconvenience to the employer in de
fending a Title VII action, due to the EEOC's inability to act
promptly, must be scrutinized. In light of these concerns, courts have
had to decide whether it is unreasonable or inexcusable, pursuant to a
laches defense, for a private plaintiff to delay filing suit until the EEOC
has made its determination and issued a right-to-sue letter.
Part I of this comment traces the origin of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the legislative intent behind the creation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the EEOC's au
thority to administer Title VII discrimination claims. Part II exam
ines the development of the doctrine of laches as an equitable time
limitation on a Title VII claimant's right to bring suit.
Part III of this comment focuses on the question of whether
laches may be applied in particular instances where a Title VII claim
ant awaits the conclusion of extended EEOC proceedings, receives a
right-to-sue letter and files suit within ninety days of receipt of the
right-to-sue letter. Part III surveys various federal courts of appeals'
decisions which consider the applicability of the defense of laches to
Title VII private plaintiffs under these circumstances. Specifically,
this section separates the cases into two categories. The courts of ap
peals which support the classic laches approach will be examined,19
followed by a discussion of the courts of appeals which adhere to the
contrasting presumption approach.20
19. The courts which follow the classic laches approach accept the defense of laches
as an equitable time limitation on the private plaintiff's right to file suit in federal court.
See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, \09 S. Ct.
259 (1988); Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. \050 (\986). See also Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir.
1987).
20. The courts which follow the presumption approach generally have held that the
private plaintiff is entitled to await the completion of EEOC proceedings before filing suit.
See, e.g., Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 8\0 (9th Cir. 1985); Howard v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th
Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). These courts have shown repeated reluctance to
dismiss a private plaintiff's claim on the basis of laches and, therefore, have limited the
application of laches to rare cases. See, e.g., Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain
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While there does not appear to be a viable solution to the ques
tions of whether laches should apply in the particular circumstances
involved or at what point the elements of laches have been established,
there is an alternative answer available to the question of

how

laches

could apply when it is raised as a defense to a Title VII claim. In Part
IV, this comment suggests a method by which the district courts may
locate "a just result"21 without limiting the right of a Title VII private
plaintiff to await the EEOC's administrative resolution of claims and
without providing for the indefinite tolling of a claim to the prejudice
of the defendant-employer.

I.

A.

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Legislative History and the Literal Requirements of Title VII
In

1964,

in response to a compelling national need and concern,22
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 23 The purpose of
Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in employment based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin24 through the utilization of
Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Boone
v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979).
21. The Supreme Court has previously noted that district courts have discretion to
locate "a just result" in light of the circumstances peculiar to a case. Langnes v. Green,
282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931).
22. In enacting Title VII, Congress was concerned mainly with eliminating racial
discrimination. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2393-94. The House Report noted that national
legislation became necessary because progress in eliminating discrimination through state
and local legislation had proceeded too slowly. Id. In addition, the committee reported
that the legislative bill dealing with discrimination "is a constitutional and desirable means
of dealing with the injustices and humiliations of racial and other discrimination. It is a
reasonable and responsible bill whose provisions are designed effectively to meet an urgent
and most serious national problem." Id. at 18, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2394.
23. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78
Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp.
1987)). Title VII is one of the several major titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title I
addresses enforcement of federal voting rights. 42 U.S.c. § 1971(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
Title II regulates elimination of discrimination in public accommodations. Id. § 2000a
(1982 & Supp. 1987). Title III regulates elimination of discrimination in facilities owned or
managed by a state or by one of its subdivisions. Id. § 2000b (1982). Title IV provides for
assistance in the desegregation of schools. Id. § 2000c (1982). Title V outlines the rules of
procedure of the Commission hearings. Id. § 1975a (1982). Title VI addresses discrimina
tion in programs receiving federal financial assistance. Id. § 2000d (1982 & Supp. 1987).
Title VIII requires the compilation of registration and voting statistics. Id. § 2000f (1982).
Title IX allows for Attorney General intervention after removal in civil rights cases. Id.
§ 2000h-2 (1982). Title X establishes a Community Relations Service. Id. § 2000g (1982).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1982 & Supp. 1987). See supra note 1 for the text
of § 2000e-2(a) which outlines the unlawful employment practices of an employer. Other
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formal and informal remedial procedures. 25 By its action, Congress
acknowledged the prevalence of employment discrimination in the
United States and the need for federal legislation to remedy the inequi
ties associated with employment discrimination. 26
The Civil Rights Act authorized the establishment of an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)27 and delegated to it
the primary responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful em
ployment practices in the United States. 28 As enacted in 1964, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act created the EEOC to administer provisions
of Title VII and to encourage the achievement of equal opportunity
employment.29
Title VII, however, limited the EEOC's functions to the investiga
30
tion of employment discrimination charges and informal methods of
unlawful employment practices include discriminating against any employee for making
charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings. [d. § 2000e·3(a).
In addition, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to print or publish any
notice or advertisement indicating a prohibited preference, limitation, specification or dis
crimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. [d. § 2000e-3(b).
25. The legislative history of Title VII indicates a congressional desire for out-of
court settlement of Title VII violations. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12
13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2147-48. When the EEOC
determines after an investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that a charge is
true, Title VII mandates that it endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1982). The EEOC understands its objective under this provision as being to
achieve voluntary compliance with Title VII by means of a written agreement resulting
from conciliation. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1988); EEOC CampI. Man. (BNA) § 60.1 (Mar.
1979). This agreement should embody a just resolution of the issues and assure that the
respondent will eliminate unlawful employment practices and take appropriate affirmative
action. [d.
26. Title VII of the Act was enacted with the primary objective of improving the
status of minorities and women in the United States. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2139.
27. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4 (1982).
28. [d. § 2000e-5(a). See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
creation, composition, and political representation of the EEOC.
29. The United States Supreme Court has said that the objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII "was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees
over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). What is
required, said the Court, "is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification." [d. at 431.
.
30. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 705-706, 78
Stat. 241, 258-61 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5(b) (1982». Title
VII requires the EEOC to investigate charges it receives. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
The EEOC approaches its investigative task in both formal and informal ways. On the
informal level, the EEOC requests the employer to allow the EEOC to interview its person
nel, tour its facilities and inspect its employment records. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 23
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conciliation and persuasion. 31 In effect, the failure of EEOC concilia
tion efforts terminated its involvement in, the claim. Enforcement
could be achieved, if at all, only if the Title VII claimant initiated a
private suit within thirty days after the receipt of EEOC notification
that conciliation efforts had not been successful. 32
When it originally enacted Title VII, Congress hoped to en
courage eI?ployers to comply voluntarily with the Act. 33 The refusal
(Mar. 1979); EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 26 (May 1979). If informal methods are un
availing, however, the EEOC has subpoena power which it may use in appropriate cases to
compel'the production of needed evidence. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (1988); EEOC Compl.
Man. (BNA) § 24 (Aug. 1984).
Title VII provides that in connection with any investigation of a charge, the EEOC
shall have access to and the right to copy "any evidence of any person being investigated or
proceeded against that relates to" the unlawful employment practices prohibited by Title
VII and that "is relevant to the charge under investigation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)
(1982). The information which the EEOC uncovers in its investigation is kept confidential
from the public, but the parties actually engaged in the investigation, and their attorneys,
are entitled to examine the EEOC's files under most circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22
(1988); EEOC Com pI. Man. (BNA) § 83.5 (Mar. 1979).
31. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a)-(e), 78
Stat. 241, 259-60 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982». If the EEOC
determines, after an investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that a charge is
true, Title VII mandates that it endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id. The EEOC
attempts to "achieve a just resolution of all violations found and to obtain agreement that
the respondent will eliminate the unlawful employment practice and provide appropriate
affirmative relief." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1988). If accepted by the employer, the remedy is
embodied in a conciliation agreement that is signed by the charging party and the em
ployer. Id. If the employer fails or refuses to conciliate or to make a good faith effort to
resolve the dispute, the EEOC may terminate its conciliation efforts and so notify the em
ployer. Id. § 1601.25.
32. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat.
241, 260 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982». When Congress first
enacted Title VII it selected "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance ... as the preferred
means for achieving" the goal of equality of employment opportunities. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976). To this
end Congress established an administrative procedure whereby the EEOC "would have an
opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the
aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit." Id.
33. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2143-44. The House Report stated:
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and
distinguishable events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some iden
tifiable individual or organization. It was thought that a scheme which stressed
conciliation rather than compulsory processes would be more appropriate for the
resolution of this essentially "human" problem. Litigation, it was thought, would
be necessary only on an occasional basis in the event of determined recalcitrance.
Experience, however, has shown this to be an oversimplified expectation, incor
rect in its conclusions.
Id.
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of many employers to comply, however, compelled Congress to
strengthen the EEOC's investigatory and enforcement powers. 34 Sub
sequently, Congress amended Title VII by passing the Equal Employ
ment Opportunity Act of 1972. 35 The 1972 amendment, while
enlarging the powers of the EEOC to include enforcement,36 retained
the previous emphasis on the administrative resolution and concilia
tion of charges. 37 Congress did not abandon its belief that violations
of the statute could be remedied without resort to the courts. This is
evidenced by the fact that before the EEOC may bring a civil suit it
must follow a series of prescribed administrative steps. 38
The administrative procedures begin with the filing of a charge
with the EEOC alleging that an employer has engaged in an unlawful
employment practice. 39 A charge ~ust be filed within one hundred
and eighty days after the occurrence of the allegedly qiscriminatory
act, and the EEOC is required to serve notice of the charge on the
34. [d. "Facts, statistical evidence and experience demonstrate that employers, labor
organizations, employment agencies and joint labor-management committees continue to
engage in conduct which contravenes the provisions of Title VII. The existence of such
practices demonstrates the immediate need to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964." [d. at 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2144.
35. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. \03
(amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716,78 Stat. 241, 253-66,
and codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (\ 982 & Supp. 1987».
36. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f) (1982). Under the 1972 amendment, the EEOC, if it is
unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement within thirty days after filing of the
charge, may bring an action against any respondent not a government, governmental
agency or political subdivision named in the charge. [d. at § 2000e-5(f)(I). The EEOC
may sue on the basis either of a private charge of employment discrimination or on a
charge filed by a commissioner of the EEOC. In cases against a state or local government,
the attorney general, rather than the EEOC, is authorized to bring the action. [d. Under
the 1972 amendment, the individual retains the right to bring a court action if dissatisfied
with the EEOC's handling of the case. [d. See supra note 7 for the text of 42 U.S.C.
§ 20(K)e-5(f)(I).
37. [d. Title VII retains the general scheme of the original act which enables the
EEOC to process a charge of employment discrimination through the investigation and
conciliation stages. 118 CONGo REC. 7563, 7564 (1972). In addition, Title VII "now au
thorizes the EEOC ... to file a civil action against the respondent in an appropriate Federal
District Court, if it has been unable to eliminate an alleged unlawful employment practice
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." [d.
38. See generally Note, Procedural Prerequisites for Bringing a Title VII Action - 42
u.s.c. § 2000e-5, 27 How. L.J. 437 (1984).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(a) (1988) provides:
A charge that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employ
ment practice within the meaning of Title VII may be made by or on behalf of
any person claiming to be aggrieved. A charge on behalf of a person claiming to
be aggrieved may be made by any person, agency, or organization.
[d.
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employer within ten days of filing. 40
After serving notice of the charge on the employer, the EEOC
must commence an investigation to determine whether there is reason
able cause to believe that the charge is true. 41 This investigation
culminates in a "no cause" or "reasonable cause" determination. 42
The EEOC's determination is to be made "as promptly as possible
and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days
from the filing of the charge. "43 If the EEOC determines that there is
40. 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982) provides that a charge must be filed within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred and notice of the
charge must be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days
thereafter. The notice of the charge must include the date, place and circumstances of the
alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. A copy of the charge shall be served by mail or
in person. 29 C.F.R. § l601.14(a) (1988).
The purpose of this notice is to alert the Title VII defendant promptly of the possibil
ity of an enforcement suit so that steps may be taken to protect the defendant's interests.
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372 (1977). The courts have differed as to
whether this period is directory or jurisdictional, the majority concluding that it is simply a
direction to the EEOC and will not bar a suit if the EEOC fails to give timely notice.
Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 424 (6th Cir. 1974) (service of notice
on a respondent within \0 days is not a jurisdictional requirement). See Note, Time Limi
tations For Title VII Suits, 14 GA. L. REV. 540, 545 n.28 (1980). The courts are hesitant to
preclude the enforcement of the plaintiffs' rights on matters which are beyond their control.
See Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd,
633 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Askins v. Imperial Reading
Corp., 420 F. Supp. 413, 416 (W.O. Va. 1976). As a result of this interpretation, it is
evident that the ten day requirement for notice is not mandatory.
41. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). Normal EEOC practice, after an EEOC investi
gation begins, is to conduct an on-site investigation or plant tour. EEOC CornpI. Man.
(BNA) § 25.2 (June 1985). During the inspection, the investigator will pay particular at
tention to the charging party's worksite to acquire a general understanding of the work
environment and specific information relating to the allegations. Id. § 25.5(d)(I). After the
plant tour, the investigator will customarily request particular records from the employer.
Id. § 26.1 (May 1979). The types of records which an employer will be expected to provide
include payroll records, seniority lists, job descriptions, collective bargaining agreements,
personnel records and the company's written affirmative action program, if there is one.
Id. § 26.2(c).
42. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19, .21 (1988). The result of the EEOC's deliberations is
called a "determination." Thus, there are two possible determinations for any given
charge. A "no cause" determination is meant to indicate to the charging party that the
EEOC has fully considered the allegations and has concluded that there is not reasonable
cause to believe that employment discrimination has occurred. Id. § 1601.19. If a "no
.cause" result is reached, the EEOC will dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person
claiming to be aggrieved, and the respondent, of its action. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
A "reasonable cause" decision, on the other hand, signifies a belief by the EEOC that a
violation of Title VII has in fact occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (1988). Title VII requires
the EEOC, upon reaching a "reasonable cause" decision, to endeavor to eliminate the al
leged unlawful employment practice. Id. § 1601.24; 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b) (1988) ("the
Commission shall provide prompt notification of its determination ... to the person claim
ing to be aggrieved ... and the respondent.").
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not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the EEOC must
dismiss the charge and notify the employee and the employer.44 If,
however, the EEOC determines "after such investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission
shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua
sion. "45 In conciliation efforts, the EEOC's regulations require it to
"attempt to achieve a just resolution of all violations found and to
obtain agreement that the respondent will eliminate the unlawful em
ployment practice and provide appropriate affirmative relief."46 Suc
cessful conciliation avoids litigation through the execution of a formal
conciliation agreement. 47 Only after the EEOC determines that it has
been unsuccessful in securing a satisfactory conciliation agreement
from an employer may it bring a civil action. 48 If the EEOC does not
bring an action within one hundred and eighty days after the claim is
filed, it must then notify the aggrieved party of the faiJure of con cilia
tion.49 The private civil action must be commenced within ninety days
of receipt from the EEOC of a notice of right to sue. 50
44. If the EEOC makes a "no cause" determination, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (1988)
provides:
The person claiming to be aggrieved or the person on whose behalf a charge was
filed may request a review of the issuing director's determination within 14 days
of the date of the issuing director's determination by the Director .... The issu
ing director's letter of determination shall inform the person claiming to be ag
grieved or the person on whose behalf a charge was filed of the right to sue in
federal district court within 90 days of the date that the issuing director's letter of
determination becomes the Commission's final determination.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (1988). If the aggrieved does not request a review of the "no cause" .
determination, the determination becomes final on the 15th day from the date of issuance.
Id. § 1601.19(a)(I).
45. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (1988).
47. A settlement agreement may be negotiated at several different stages during the
processing of a discrimination charge. The charge may be resolved in a pre-determination
settlement negotiated after the charge is filed, but before the EEOC makes a reasonable
cause determination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1988); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EM
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 944 (2d ed. 1983). The settlement of a claim brought
under Title VII in a federal district court may be incorporated later in a consent decree,
subject to the court's approval and enforceable under the court's contempt powers. See
EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1982).
48. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
49. Id. In Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,361 (1977), the Supreme
Court held that no section of the Act required the conciliation effort to be concluded in any
definite period of time. The 180-day provision merely limits the right to bring a private
action. Whereupon, if the plaintiff is not satisfied with the efforts of the EEOC, the plain
tiff's right to bring an action does not arise until one hundred and eighty days after the
charge has been filed with the EEOC. Id.
50. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). The plaintiff must file a complaint in federal
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Congress, in granting the EEOC the power to bring suit directly
in federal court, preserved the employee's private right of action cre
ated under Title VII.51 Under the provisions of section 706(f)(1), as
amended, a potential litigant who has met the required charge filing
deadlines 52 may file a civil action with the appropriate federal district
court within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the
EEOC. 53 Under this subsection, the EEOC must notify the employee
of his right to sue if the EEOC does not find reasonable cause, takes no
action regarding the charge, or has not secured a conciliation agree
ment that is acceptable to the agency within one hundred and eighty
days after the charge is filed. 54 The ISO-day limitation provides that a
complainant whose charge is not dismissed, promptly settled, or liti
gated by the EEOC may bring a lawsuit, but must wait one hundred
and eighty days before doing SO.55 After the one hundred and eighty
days have passed, the aggrieved party may either file a private suit
within ninety days after EEOC notification of right to sue or continue
to leave the resolution of the charge to the efforts of the EEOC. 56

B.

National Policies and Priorities Reflected By Title VII

Section 706(f)(1) is the heart of the Equal Employment Opportu
district court within ninety days of receipt of the EEOC's statutory notice of the right to
sue and not within ninety days of receipt of notice from the EEOC of the failure of concilia
tion. In addition, the 90-day period runs from receipt and not issuance of the right-to-sue
letter. See Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977).
51. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982).
52. Id. § 2000e-5(e). See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
53. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. A charging party has an unqualified right to obtain a right-to-sue letter from
the EEOC after one hundred and eighty days from effective filing of a charge with the
EEOC, regardless of whether the EEOC has completed its administrative process. 29
C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1988). Upon receipt of the right-to-sue letter, the charging party has
ninety days to file a court suit, in default of which the party is barred from bringing a Title
VII action on the basis of the original charge . .See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (charging party's "receiving and acting upon the Commission's statu
tory notice of the right to sue" is a "jurisdictional prerequisite" to Title VII suit). If, how
ever, the charging party permits the. EEOC procedures to continue after the 180-day
period, the 90-day period for commencing suit does not automatically start to run. Rather,
the 90-day period is' triggered only by the receipt of the right-to-sue letter. It is generally
true that there is no definite period within which the charging party is required to file suit
in court up until the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter and starts the 90-day period running.
See generally Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. de
nied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
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nity Act of 1972.57 The legislative history of section 706(f)(1) pro
vides firm evidence that the purpose of this provision is to afford an
aggrieved person the option of withdrawing a case from the EEOC if
dissatisfied with the rate at which the charge is being processed. 58
Both the House and Senate Reports expressly provide that the purpose
of section 706(f)(I) is to give the charging party an option to circum
vent extended EEOC delays resulting from the EEOC's burgeoning
workload and insufficient resources. 59
Specifically, in the House Report discussing the provisions of the
bill, Congress recognized that the EEOC's workload was enormous,
frequently causing administrative delays and frustrating the remedial
character of the EEOC's actions. 6O Congress believed that granting
the employee the private right to sue would best alleviate the "admin
istrative quagmire" that often developed. 61
The Senate Report also explained that this provision became nec
essary because the EEOC's heavy caseload could result in delays una,c
ceptable to aggrieved persons:
As it indicated in testimony, [the EEOC's] caseload has increased at
57. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). For the text of section 706(f)(I), see supra
note 4.
58. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2137,2147-48.
59. [d. See also S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 410, 432 (1972).
60. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2147. Specifically, the House Report stated:
In recent years regulatory agencies have been submerged with increasing work
loads which strain their resources to the breaking point. The Commission has
stated, in testimony before this committee, that its caseload has increased even
more rapidly than its projections had anticipated. The result of this increasing
use of many of the Federal regulatory agencies has frequently affected those agen
cies' abilities to remain current on all of the matters for which they are responsi
ble. This has led to lengthy delays in the administrative process and has
frequently frustrated the remedial role of the agency.
[d. Congress believed that granting the private plaintiff the right to sue is appropriate
where the delay is occasioned by administrative inefficiencies. [d. at 13, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2148.
61. [d. at 12-13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2147-48.
The House Report stated:
In the case of the Commission, the burgeoning workload, accompanied by insuffi
cient funds and a shortage of staff, has, in many instances, forced a party to wait 2
to 3 years before final conciliation procedures can be instituted. This situation
leads the committee to believe that the private right of action, both under the
present Act and in the bill, provides the aggrieved party a means by which he may
be able to escape from the administrative quagmire which occasionally surrounds
a case caught in an overloaded administrative process.
.
[d. at 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2147-48.
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a rate which surpasses its own projections. The result has been in
creasing backlogs in making determinations, and the possibility of
occasional hasty decisions, made under the press of time, which
have unfairly prejudiced complaints. Accordingly, where the Com
mission is not able to pursue a complaint with satisfactory speed, or
enters into an agreement which is not acceptable to the aggrieved
party, the bill provides that the individual shall have an opportunity
to seek his own remedy, even though he may have originally sub
mitted his charge to the Commission. 62

Despite its support for the private right to sue, the Sen~te Report ex
pressed the preference "that recourse to this remedy will be the excep
tion and not the rule."63
Ultimately, both Houses concluded that the retention of the pri
vate right of action was designed to provide the aggrieved person with
an option to pursue a prompt remedy through the EEOC's admini
strative proceedings or through a private action. 64 In addition, the
Conference Report for both Houses declared that the EEOC's admin
istrative resolution of claims is the legislatively preferred method of
handling employment discrimination claims and that the priority of
Title VII is to protect the aggrieved person's option to seek a quick
and effective remedy in the best manner available. 65
The legislative history of section 706(f)(1) demonstrates that an
aggrieved person, unwilling to await the termination of lengthy EEOC
administrative proceedings, may request a right-to-sue letter one hun
dred and eighty days after a charge has been filed with the EEOC and
62. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 410, 432 (1972).
63. Id.
64. A section-by-section analysis presented to both Houses in the Conference Report
provides the final and conclusive meaning of section 706(f)(I):
. The retention of the private right of action, as amended, ... is designed to make
sure that the person aggrieved does not have to endure lengthy delays if the Com
mission ... does not act with due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the provi
sions ... allow the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy
under this title in the courts where there is agency inaction, dalliance or dismissal
of the charge, or unsatisfactory resolution.
118 CONGo REC. 7166, 7168 (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 - Conference
Report); 118 CONGo REC. 7563, 7565 (Conference Report on H.R. 1746, The Equal Em
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972).
65. Id.
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the
rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices
of the EEOC .... However, as the individual's rights to redress are paramount
under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for
quick and effective relief.
Id.
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may institute a private lawsuit within ninety days of receipt of the
right-to-sue letter.66 If the party prefers, however, section 706(f)(1)
provides that an aggrieved party may await the termination of EEOC
proceedings before initiating a private action. 67 Neither section
706(f)(1) nor any other section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
explicitly requires the EEOC to conclude its conciliation efforts within
any maximum period of time. 68
II.

THE COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWER To LOCATE A JUST
RESULT IN THE CONTEXT OF TITLE VII

There are no statutory limitations facing Title VII claimants
awaiting EEOC action under section 706(f)(1).69 The courts, how
ever, have had to decide whether equitable considerations affect a Title
VII claimant's decision to indefinitely delay bringing suit until comple:
tion of lengthy EEOC proceedings. Cases indicate that equitable con
siderations have influenced the Supreme Court when it considered
claims under Title VII.
In Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court upheld
the timeliness of an EEOC Title VII enforcement suit charging dis
crimination in employment on the basis of sex and held that the 180
day limitation provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I) is not a statutory
limitation on the right of the EEOC to bring an action after the expira
tion of one hundred and eighty days from the filing of a charge. 7o In
66. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e·5(f)(1) (1982).
67.
68.

Id.
Id.

69. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(e), (f)(I) (1982). The sole limitation period on Title VII
claims is embodied in Title VII's own time limits on filing charges and giving notice to the
employer. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. A Title VII claimant must file a
claim with the EEOC within one hundred and eighty days after the allegedly discrimina
tory act occurred. Id. § 2000e-5(e). Once EEOC proceedings 'have terminated and the
agency issues its right-to-sue letter, the claimant has ninety days to file suit in federal court.
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(I). If, however, the EEOC proceedings are still in progress, a claimant
may request a right-to-sue letter one hundred and eighty days after the filing of the charge.
Id. This 180-day provision is not a statute of limitations. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977). Rather, "it simply provides that a complainant whose
charge is not dismissed or promptly settled or litigated by the EEOC may himself bring a
lawsuit, but that he must wait 180 days before doing so." Id.
70. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). In Occidental, an employee of Occidental Life Insurance
Company filed a Title VII sex discrimination claim with the EEOC on March 9, 1971.
After investigation, the EEOC served proposed findings of fact on Occidental. Conciliation
attempts between the EEOC and Occidental began in the summer of 1972 and continued
sporadically into 1973. On September 13, 1973, the EEOC determined that the conciliation
efforts had failed and notified both Occidental and the employee. The employee requested
the case be referred to the EEOC to bring an enforcement action. On February 22, 1974,
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addition, the Court acknowledged the procedural safeguards in the
EEOC regulations,71 but found it "possible that despite these proce
dural protections a defendant in a Title VII enforcement action might
still be significantly handicapped in making his defense because of an
inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action .... "72 In the event of an
unexcused delay by the EEOC, the Court suggested that federal courts
exercise their discretionary73 power "to locate 'a just result' in light of
more than three years after the claim was filed with the EEOC and five months after EEOC
conciliation efforts had failed, the EEOC filed suit. Id. at 357-58.
The district court granted Occidental's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the enforcement action was time barred by § 706(f)(1) of the Act, since the action had
not been brought within one hundred and eighty days of the formal filing of the charge with
the EEOC. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that
§ 706(f)(I) imposes no limitation upon the EEOC's power to file suit in federal court. Id.
at 358.
In Occidental, the Supreme Court acknowledged Congress' expressed "concern for the
need of time limitations in the fair operation of the Act," but noted that Congress' "con
cern was directed entirely to the initial filing of a charge with the EEOC and prompt notifi
cation thereafter to the alleged violator." Id. at 371. The Court affirmed the court of
appeals' decision holding that the provisions of § 706(f)(I) and the legislative history
showed that it was intended to enable an aggrieved person unwilling to await the conclu
sion of extended EEOC proceedings to institute a private lawsuit one hundred and eighty
days after a charge has been filed. The Court further determined that nothing in the sub
section indicated that the EEOC's enforcement powers ceased if the aggrieved person de
cided to leave the case in the hands of the EEOC rather than pursuing a private action. Id.
at 361-73. "[N]either § 706(f) nor any other section of the Act explicitly requires the
EEOC to conclude its conciliation efforts and bring an enforcement suit within any maxi
mum period of time." Id. at 360.
.
71. Id. at 358-73. The EEOC regulations require that a charge be filed with the
EEOC within one hundred and eighty days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e) (1982). In addition, the alleged violator must be notified of the charge within
ten days thereafter. Id. See also 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b). Moreover, regulations promul
gated by the EEOC require that the charged party be notified when a determination of
reasonable cause has been made, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(a), (b) (1988), and when the EEOC
has terminated its efforts to conciliate a dispute. Id. § 1601.25. In effect, "during the pen
dency of EEOC administrative proceedings, a potential defendant is kept informed of the
progress of the action." Occidental, 432 U.S. at 372.
72. Id. at 373. In Occidental, the Court realized that the absence of time limitations
on the bringing of lawsuits might ultimately result in prejudice to the employer in making a
defense. Id. In such a case, the Court asserted that "the federal courts do not lack the
power to provide relief." Id. Specifically, the Court suggested that when prejudice to the
employer does result, "the trial court may restrict or even deny backpay relief." Id. (citing
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1975».
73. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931). In Langnes, the Court stated that:
The term 'discretion' denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. When invoked
as a guide to judicial action it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion
exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable
under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience
of the judge to a just result.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the circumstances peculiar to the case. "74
One equitable consideration available to courts acting in their dis
cretion is the doctrine of laches. 75 Laches is an equitable doctrine
which is frequently termed the "doctrine of stale demand."76 The
doctrine of laches may be defined generally as a rule of equity by
which equitable relief is denied to one who has been guilty of uncon
scionable delay, as shown by surrounding facts and circumstances, in
seeking that relief. 77 Specifically, laches has been defined as "neglect
or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time of
more or less duration, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in a court of equity."78
A.'

The Doctrine of Laches As A Means Of Providing Equitable
Relief From The Prosecution Of Stale Claims

Although Occidental does not specifically mention the equitable
doctrine of laches by name, the allusion seems unmistakable since the
case holds that there is no statute of limitations on EEOC enforcement
suits. 79 In Occidental, the Supreme Court refused to impose a time
limitation on the power of the EEOC to file suit in a federal court.
The Court acknowledged, however, that the absence of such a time
limitation may result in prejudice to a Title VII defendant due to an
inordinate EEOC delay. Therefore, the Court held that the trial
courts possess the discretionary power to provide relief in particular
cases where the defendant is in fact prejudiced by the unexcused
delay.80
The equitable doctrine of laches is premised upon the same prin
ciple that underlies statutes of limitations. This prinCiple includes the
desire to avoid unfairness that can result from the prosecution of stale
74. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 373 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405; 4i4-25 (1975».
75.. Another such equitable consideration available to courts acting in their discre
tion is the granting and denial of back pay. See infra notes 181-98 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the back pay remedy.
76. See Mexican Nat'l Coal, Timber & Iron Co. v. Frank, 154 F. 217, 236 (C.C.S.D.
Tex. 1907) (quoting McCampbell v. Durst, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 522, 535,40 S.W. 315, 322
(1897»; Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. Supp. 104, 126 (W.D. La.
1958) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. Equity §§ 489-509 at 352 (1939».
77. Annotation, Laches As Precluding Cancellation ofor Other ReliefAgainst Release
forPersonal Injuries, 34 A.L.R.2d 1314 (1954).
78. Freymark v. Handke, 415 Ill. 360, 366, 114 N.E.2d 349, 352 (1953).
79.. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 361. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Occidental decision.
80. Id. at 373.

252

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11 :235

claims. 81 The application oflaches, however, departs from the opera
tion of statutes of limitations in that laches is more flexible and de
pends upon equitable circumstances rather than on delay alone. 82
Where there has been no inexcusable or unreasonable delay in seeking
a remedy and/or the defendant has not been prejudiced by the mere
passage of time, there is no reason to deny relief. Thus, the application
of laches is left to the court's discretion. 83 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized "[t]hat no arbitrary or fixed period
of time has been, or will be, established as an inflexible rule, but that
the delay which will defeat such a suit must in every case depend on
the peculiar equitable circumstances of that case."84
As a result of the application of the doctrine of laches, a case may
ultimately be dismissed before the merits of the plaintiff's claim are
reached. Courts agree, however, that the judicial system was desigqed
"not only to right wrongs, but to do so fairly and equitably."85
B.

The Defense Of Laches As An Equitable Time Limitation On A
Title VII Claimant's Right To Bring Suit

To sustain the defense of laches two elements must be shown:
first, an unreasonable or inexcusable delay on the part of the plaintiff
81. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282-83 (1961). See also Randolph's Ex'r.
v. Quidnick Co., 135 U.S. 457 (1890). In equity, a demand must be made within a reason
able time or the claim is considered stale, and courts of equity refuse their aid to stale
demands where the party has slept on his/her rights. See Urquhart v. McDonald, 252 Ala.
505,509,42 So. 2d 9, 13 (1949); Sampson v. Cottongim, 249 Ky. 670, 671, 61 S.W.2d 309,
310 (1933); Burns v. Dillon, 226 Ky. 82, 88, 9 S.W.2d 1095, 1098 (1928).
82. Unlike a statutory period of limitation, laches is not a mere matter of elapsed
time, but is principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced.
Delay, although an important consideration in determining whether relief will be barred in
equity because of laches, is not decisive. See Archambault v. Sprouse, 215 S.c. 336, 55
S.E.2d 70 (1949). Lapse of time is only one of the elements to be considered in determini.ng
the existence and application of laches as a defense in a suit of equity. See Finucane v.
Hayden, 86 Idaho 199, 206, 384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963) (Lapse of time is an element but not
the controlling factor of laches.).
83. The determination of whether the doctrine of laches should be applied proceeds
in light of the circumstances of the particular case before the court and according to right
and justice. What might be inexcusable delay in one case might not be inconsistent with
diligence in another. See Alsop v. Riker, 155 U.S. 448, 461 (1894) (length of time which
must pass in order to show laches varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case);
Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224 (1892); Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 501, 31
N.E. 691, 693 (1892) ("Whether the right to equitable relief is affected by acquiescence
depends upon the circumstances of each case."); Bowen v. Hamilton, 393 P.2d 858 (Okla.
1964).
84. The Key City, 81 U.S. 653, 660 (1871).
85. EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 641 F. S,upp. liS, 127-28 (S.D. Ind. 1986).
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in bringing suit; and second, undue prejudice to the defendant. 86
These elements are conjunctive, and, since laches is considered an af
firmative defense, the burden of establishing both is on the
defendant. 87
Since the Occidental 88 decision, a majority of courts have held
that Title VII suits are subject to the doctrine of laches. 89 Addition
ally, the doctrine of laches has been applied to Title VII lawsuits both
when the EEOC is suing on behalf of the charging party90 and when
the charging party is suing as plaintiff.91
86. Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980). In general, a suit is held to be barred by the doctrine oflaches
where the following factors are present: 1) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the, defendant's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; and 2) injury or prejUdice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred. See also
Johnson v. Delony, 241 Ala. 16, 1 So. 2d 11 (1941); Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237,
242,56 N.W.2d 570, 574 (1953) ("The doctrine of laches is an equitable doctrine intended
to prevent one who has not been diligent in asserting a known right from recovering at the
expense of one who has been prejudiced by the delay.").
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) provides that "[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively ... laches, ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense."
88. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local 1 v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,
839 F.2d 1147, 1153 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Whitfield V. Anheuser
Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1987); Waddell V. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d
69 (3d Cir. 1986); Jeffries V. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986); Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1985);
Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co.,
596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
90. The applicability of the laches doctrine to Title VII actions when the EEOC is
suing was established by EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1980). In
Massey-Ferguson, the court found that the EEOC's enforcement suit was unreasonably
delayed, and it remanded for a determination of the employer'S prejudice. Id. at 273. The
court stated that although Title VII imposes no express limitation on the time within which
the EEOC may bring a suit, the EEOC may be barred by laches from filing a suit. Id. at
275. Recourse to the doctrine of laches is appropriate, the court said, if the EEOC has
"unduly, inexcusably, unreasonably, or inordinately delayed in asserting a claim," and if
that delay has "substantially, materially, or seriously prejudiced" the defendant's ability to
conduct the defense. Id.
See also EEOC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating
that the "tortoise-like" speed with which the EEOC had handled the suit had "cost it the
race"); EEOC V. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1980); EEOC V. Radiator Specialty
Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging the applicability of the doctrine of laches
to Title VII claims, but rejecting the laches defense under the particular circumstances of
the case); EEOC v. Nicholson File Co., 408 F. Supp. 229 (D. Conn. 1976).
91. The applicability of the laches doctrine to Title VII actions when the charging
party is suing as plaintiff has been similarly established in Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596
F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). In Bernard, the court acknowledged
o
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The principle that Title VII suits are subject to the equitable doc
trine of laches does not mean that delay in the processing of a claim
necessarily leads to the doctrine being applied. As stated above, to
apply laches to a Title VII case, the defendant must satisfy the court
on both prongs of the two-prong laches test. 92 Specifically, the defendthat the doctrine of laches is applicable to Title VII actions brought by private plaintiffs,
but that plaintiff's failure to file a Title VII claim until completion of the EEOC process
was not inexcusable delay and could not support the application of laches to the particular
.
facts of the case. Id. at 1256.
See also Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp: 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978);
Fannie v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., Derry Div., 445 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
92. In particular instances where the defense of laches has succeeded in barring a
Title VII claim, courts have found that the plaintiff's delay was both unreasonable and
prejudicial to the defendant. EEOC v. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1978).
In Liberty Loan, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held an EEOC administrative delay
of four years and four months to be unreasonable and upheld the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant based on its finding of sufficient prejudice. Id. at 857
58. The court found that under the circumstances presented, the delay was not only inordi
nately long, but was caused in part by the agency's unexplained failure to properly conduct
its investigation. Id. at 857.
Concerning the prejudice resulting from the delay, the court found that prejudice to
the employer existed, even assuming that relevant records could be located. This prejudice
was due to the hardship in locating former employees and procuring their testimony. Id. at
858. In its finding, the court noted that of the one hundred and forty-five persons employed
with the company during the relevant period, only five were still so employed. In addition,
the supervisors familiar with the employee were no longer employed by the company nor
were any persons responsible for the company's personnel policies and practices during
that relevant time period. Finally, noting that the company had also undergone a reorg~ni
zation, the court found that the employer was now an essentially different company from
that which allegedly discriminated against the employee. Id. at 855. It would be grossly
unfair, the court concluded, to require the employer to spend large amounts of time and
money to locate former employees and records in order to defend an essentially moot law
suit which was unreasonably delayed by the EEOC. Id. at 858. See also Fridy v. Moultrie,
595 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1984).
Conversely, where the doctrine of laches has failed to bar a Title VII claim, courts
have found, under the particular facts and circumstances of a case, that the equitable de
fense of laches was not established or supportable. Specifically, courts have found that
plaintiff's delay in bringing suit was not unreasonable or inexcusable, and/or that the de
fendant was not prejudiced as a result of the delay. In Askins v. Imperial Reading Corp.,
420 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Va. 1976), the United States District Court for the Western Dis
trict of Virginia held that laches did not apply to a Title VII action brought by private
plaintiffs more than four years after the filing of an employment discrimination claim with
the EEOC because it was not shown that prejudice had resulted to the defendant. In As
kins, each of the named plaintiffs filed a race and sex discrimination charge with the EEOC
in May, 1971. The EEOC commenced an investigation at that time and subsequently is
sued letters of determination in February, 1974. Thereafter, the EEOC and Imperial en
tered into conciliation discussions. Conciliation efforts continued unsuccessfully through
August, 1974, whereupon the EEOC invited plaintiffs to request a right-to-sue letter.
Plaintiffs promptly filed their requests; however, the EEOC delayed issuing the right-to-sue
letters until November, 1975. Plaintiffs commenced their Title VII class action lawsuit in
February, 1975. While noting that the EEOC's delay in this case meant that the court
sitting in 1976 would be adjudicating claims reaching back to 1969 with evidence adduced

1989]

LACHES AS A DEFENSE

255

ant must establish that the delay was inexcusable or unreasonable 93
and resulted in undue prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend the
case on the merits. 94 One court stated that, in its determination, a
court should examine "the length of the delay, the reasons therefor,
reaching even further into the past, the court determined that "in the absence of specific
prejudice to the Defendant," the court could not penalize Title VII plaintiffs for any delay.
Id. at 416. The court acknowledged, however, that as the action progressed the defense of
laches may, if appropriate, be applied in any relief granted. Id. "This is not to say that as
this action progresses, the doctrine oflaches may not, if appropriate, be applied in any relief
granted." Id. See also Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 550 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
93. Where laches is argued as a defense to a Title VII claim, the determination of
whether the delay of a plaintiff is inexcusable or unreasonable is closely related to whether
the defendant suffered prejudice from the delay. Gull Airborne Instruments, Inc. v. Wein
berger, 694 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Weinberger, the court stated that where the
delay is a short period of time, the magnitude of prejudice required is great; if the delay is
lengthy, prejudice is more likely to have occurred and less proof of the prejudice will be
necessary. Id. (quoting Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 807 (8th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980».
In Title VII cases where the private plaintiff delays in bringing suit, some courts con
sider the nature of the EEOC's administrative activity and conciliation efforts on behalf of
the plaintiff in their determination of "unreasonableness." For example, the courts in the
following cases held that lengthy delays by private plaintiffs in bringing Title VII actions
were reasonable where the plaintiffs awaited the outcome of the EEOC administrative pro
cess and ·EEOC efforts on behalf of the plaintiffs were active and continuing: Holsey v.
Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985); Howard v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984); Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978). Alternatively, where the EEOC has been
characterized as dormant in processing the private plaintiff's Title VII claim, the following
courts considered the plaintiff's delay in bringing court action unreasonable: Jeffries v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986);
Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th CiT. 1979); Lynn v. Western Gil
lette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977).
The courts recognize, however, that the nature of the EEOC's activity is but one factor
to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's own delay, and the deter
mination must be made in consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's
~ctions. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d
1147, 1153-54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988).
94. Where laches is argued as a defense to a Title VII claim, the prejudice suffered by
the defendant will usually consist of the unavailability of witnesses, changes in work force
and personnel structure, and loss of records occasioned by the plaintiff's delay in bringing
suit. See Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980); Boone v. Mechanical
Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th CiT. 1979).
In Jones, the court, in analyzing possible prejudice to the defendant occasioned by a
Title VII plaintiff's more than nine year delay in bringing suit. emphasized that defendant's
personnel directors had changed and employees familiar with the facts had long since de
parted. In addition, the court noted that the individuals still employed had only vague
memories of events which transpired more than nine years prior to the filing of the lawsuit,
and files of possibly great importance were no longer available. Jones, 614 F.2d at 1390,
n.\.

In Boone, in which a Title VII plaintiff delayed seven years before bringing suit, the
court found the defendant's showing that missing witnesses were unavailable to testify and
that state unemployment compensation appeal files relating to plaintiff's discharge from
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how the delay affected the defendant, and the overall fairness of per
mitting the assertion of the claim."95
Each court to consider the specific issue of the applicability of the
laches doctrine to bar a Title VII action agrees, at least in theory, that
laches may be applied as an equitable time limitation on a Title VII
claimant's right to bring suit. 96 Questions arise, however, as to the
application of the defense of laches in particular circumstances. Spe
cifically, when a private plaintiff timely files a Title VII action in fed
eral court, after waiting for the conclusion of the EEOC
administrative process and within ninety days after receiving a right
to-sue letter, the question then arises when and under what circum
stances does the delay of the private plaintiff in filing suit give rise to
the equitable defense of laches. More particularly, when and under
what circumstances does the delay become "unreasonable" or "inex
cusable" so as to satisfy the first prong of the two-prong laches test.
The next section of this comment examines the disagreement among
the federal courts of appeals' decisions which have considered the ap
plicability of the doctrine of laches under these circumstances.
III.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTION OF TITLE VII CLAIMS
VERSUS THE INDEFINITE TOLLING OF CLAIMS

Against the backdrop of cases which have applied the doctrine of
laches in the context of Title VII97 and in light of the provisions in
employment were no longer available dispositive of the prejudice issue. Boone, 609 F.2d at
959.
In addition to the prejudice discussed above, resulting from the unavailability of wit
nesses and changes in personnel, is the prejudice to the employer resulting from the accrual
of potential back pay liability. If Title VII claims are litigated in a timely fashion the
employer's potential liability ceases to accrue. Conversely, if the Title VII plaintiff waits
until the completion of the EEOC proceedings before filing suit, the delay which may result
could substantially and unfairly enlarge the employer's back pay liability. This increased
monetary liability constitutes an additional element of prejudice in a laches defense. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec.,
Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981); Lynn v. Western
Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977). See infra notes 191-96 for a discussion of the
Lynn and Kamberos cases.
95. Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800,806 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
96. See generally Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986); Rozen V. District of Columbia, 702 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Boone V. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979); Bernard V. Gulf
Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
97. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See supra notes 69-74
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Occidental decision. EEOC v. Liberty Loan
Corp., 584 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1978). See supra note 92 for a discussion of the Liberty Loan
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section 706(f)(1)98 that permit a private plaintiff to await the termina
tion of EEOC proceedings before filing suit, the federal courts of ap
peals have disagreed on the specific application of equitable principles
to Title VII cases. Particularly, courts disagree on whether the appli
cation of equitable principles permits a dismissal based on laches when
a private plaintiff chooses to await the completion of lengthy EEOC
~roceedings before filing suit in federal court and the defendant em
ployer proves undue prejudice as a result of plaintiff's delay. Under
these circumstances, courts have had to decide whether it is "unrea
sonable" or "inexcusable," pursuant to a laches defense, for a private
plaintiff to delay filing suit until the EEOC has made its determination
and issued the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter. These questions raise two
competing concerns: first, concern for the EEOC's administrative res
olution of Title VII claims under section 706(f)(1), as the legislatively
preferred method for achieving the goal of equality of employment
opportunities; and second, the resulting indefinite tolling of a Title VII
claim to the prejudice of the defendant.
A.

Ad Hoc Determinations

The arguments on each side of the laches issue are compelling. A
Title VII plaintiff asserts both a statutory right to await the comple
tion of the EEOC administrative process before filing suit99 and the
congressional policy of favoring reliance on the administrative pro
ceedings. loo A Title VII defendant looks to the equitable doctrine of
laches to protect himselflherself from prejudice by the prosecution of
stale claims. 101 Both the plaintiff and defendant assert viable and sup
portable reasons for their respective positions. Neither party, how
ever, is so clearly entitled to a decision that it could be said that as a
matter of law the decision should be made in hislher favor.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh lO2 and
decision. Askins v. Imperial Reading Corp., 420 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Va. 1976). See supra
note 92 for a discussion of the Askins decision.
98. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text
for a discussion of § 706(f)(I).
99. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982).
100. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the congres
sional policies reflected in § 706(f)( 1).
101. See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the develop
ment of the doctrine of laches as a defense to Title VII claims.
102. See Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986) (relying on the administrative process of the EEOC cannot
excuse a delay of over ten years in asserting a Title VII claim).
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Eighth103 Circuits have addressed the precise issue and have taken a
classic laches approach. These courts have qeld that a private plaintiff
does not have an absolute right to await te'rmination of EEOC pro
ceedings where an unreasonable or inexcusable delay has prejudiced
the defendant employer. These courts accept the defense of laches,
based on the facts of each case, as an equitable time limitation on the
private plaintiff's right to file suit in federal court.
In sharp contrast, the Fourth,I04 Fifth,105 Sixth,106 Ninth,107
Eleventh,108 and District of Columbia109 Circuits have generally held
that a plaintiff's failure to file a Title VII lawsuit until completion of
the EEOC process is not inexcusable or unreasonable delay and, there
fore, cannot support the application of laches. To the contrary, these
courts generally grant the private plaintiff the presumption that the
plaintiff is entitled to await the completion of EEOC proceedings
before filing suit in federal court. 1 10 Despite recognizing that the doc
103. See Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988) ("doctrine of laches is a proper defense in a Title VII action"). See
also Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1987) (ten year delay in
filing suit was inexcusable).
104. See Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199,211 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1028 (1985) (charging party's "decision to rely on the [EEOC's] administrative
process before initiating a private suit is not inexcusable delay").
105. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1257 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452
U.S. 89 (1981) ("[p]laintiff's failure to file their Title VII claim until completion of the
EEOC process was not inexcusable delay and could not support the application of laches").
106. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839
F.2d 1147, 1153 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988) ("[I]n rare cases, the only
avenue for relieving unfair prejudice to the defendant is dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. ").
107. See Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1985) ("EEOC
delays are not to be charged against private plaintiffs and ... complainants are not required
to terminate the administrative process by requesting a notice of right-to-sue. "). See also
Gifford v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Ordinarily, if
the EEOC retains control over a charge, a private plaintiff will not be charged with its
mistakes. ").
But see Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1979). In
Boone, the court acknowledged that "[t]he Act clearly encourages informal conciliation of
grievances through the offices of the EEOC. Nevertheless, we cannot read Title VII as
providing for the indefinite tolling of a claim which knowingly lies dormant with the
EEOC, to the prejudice of the adversary party." Note, however, that the Boone court
stated that this is "the exception and not the general rule." /d.
108. See Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiff's failure to file a Title VII claim until completion of the administrative processes
of the EEOC was not inexcusable delay, and thus could not support the application of
laches).
109. See Rozen v. District of Columbia, 702 F.2d 1202, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (court
of appeals disagreed with the district court's determination that a private plaintiff should be
held responsible for the delay in the issuance of a right-to-sue letter).
110. The Title VII defendant may attempt to rebut this presumption by offering evi
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trine of laches may apply, these courts have shown a reluctance to
dismiss Title VII suits on the ground of laches and have limited the
defense to rare cases. III
In each case, the threshold inquiry in deciding the laches issue,
whether for the plaintiff or the defendant, is whether the plaintiff
delayed unreasonably or inexcusably in filing suit in the district court.
The circumstances militating for or against the application of the doc
trine of laches vary among the courts. Generally, in determining the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's delay, courts will consider not only
the plaintiff's conduct, but also the EEOC's delay in proceeding, inso
far as it bears on the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct. I 12
Thus, whether the circumstances of a particular case warrant the
delay depends on the particular facts of each case; and since no specific
length of time has been established by the courts as per se unreasona
ble, the determination of reasonableness must be decided on an ad hoc
basis.ll3 Accordingly, the respective decisions of the courts which
have applied the laches doctrine illustrate the fact-dependent nature of
dence of unr!!3Sonable delay on the part of the private plaintiff and resulting prejudice to
the defendant in making a defense. The presumption courts, however, hold that the appli
cation of the doctrine of laches barring Title VII claims is an exception and not the general
rule. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of such a rare case.
111. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties
Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979).
112. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1050 {I 986); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd,
452 U.S. 89 (l981).
113. See Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1986). In Wad
dell, a religious discrimination charge had been timely filed with the state deferral agency
and the EEOC. Due to a misunderstanding, the EEOC did not pick up the case after the
deferral agency dismissed the underlying charges. Even though the plaintiff wrote the
EEOC twice requesting some action, the EEOC believed that the deferral agency still had
jurisdiction and continued to defer. The plaintiff, in the meantime, received no response to
his letters. Four and one-half years after the plaintiff's last letter to the EEOC, the misun
derstanding was resolved, and the EEOC proceeded to issue a right-to-sue letter. The
plaintiff then timely filed a lawsuit some six years after he first filed an administrative
charge of discrimination. At the conclusion of a full trial, the district court found for the
plaintiff. Small Tube appealed, contending that the district court's decision was clearly
erroneous and that the court erred in failing to find Waddell's claim barred by the doctrine
of laches as a matter of law. [d. at 71-74.
After reviewing the circumstances of the case, the court of appeals concluded that,
"although plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and do
not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings where it would
appear to a reasonable person that no administrative resolution will be forthcoming,
whether the circumstances warranted the delay in a particular case requires an ad hoc
determination." [d. at 77. The circumstances in Waddell included his testimony that he
did not know a charging party could secure a right-to-sue letter one hundred and eighty
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the inquiry and the necessity for a reasoned exercise of discretion in
their determinations.
B.

Laches As An Avenue For Relieving Unfair Prejudice To The
Title VII Defendant: The Classic Laches Approach

The courts which have held that lengthy delays by private plain
tiffs in bringing Title VII actions are "inexcusable" or "unreasonable"
recognize the tremendous work load and overburdened staff of the
EEOC, but reason that there must be a limit to the prejudice and in
convenience that can be placed on a Title VII defendant because of the
EEOC's inability to act promptly in processing a plaintiff's claim.
These courts hold that a Title VII private plaintiff is not permitted to
unduly prejudice and inconvenience the defendant by relying on the
EEOC's slow process and the administrative resolution of employee
claims. 1 14
Contrary to the presumption that Title VII provides a private
plaintiff with an unqualified right to await the conclusion of EEOC
proceedings before filing suit,1I5 the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have
held that Title VII does not countenance the type of delay which re
sults in undue prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend the case on
days after a charge was filed. Furthermore, he had a limited education and was not then
represented by counsel. Id.
.
Although the court found the arguments on both sides of the laches question to have
merit, under the circumstances, it concluded that the question was too close to be deter
mined as a matter of fact, law, and discretion on appeal. The court remanded for "pivotal
findings on whether Waddell's conduct was excusable and whether Small Tube suffered
sufficient prejudice to warrant application of laches." Id. at 79.
In addition to the issue of laches as a bar to commencement of the lawsuit, the court of
appeals applied the doctrine of laches to the accrual of back pay. The trial court had ruled
that a lack of diligence prejudiced the employer because back pay continued to mount even
as the ability to defend decreased. The district court, therefore, tolled the back pay award
for a four and one-half year period. Id. at 78.
The appellate court found that "[j]ust as a decision on laches as a defense requires a
finding whether Waddell's delay was excusable or not, so also does a decision that laches
can be used to bar part of Waddell's back pay claim." Id. Although the court of appeals
remanded the case for a finding of inexcusable delay, it stated its approval of an approach
to laches which allowed the district courts to use a less draconian penalty than dismissal.
Id. at 79.
114. See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Whitfield V. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1987);
Jeffries V. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050
(1986).
115. See infra notes 146-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts of
appeals which grant the Title VII private plaintiff the presumption that they are entitled to
await the termination of EEOC proceedings before filing suit in federal court.
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the merits. I 16 In support of their determination to allow the defense of
laches to bar a Title VII claim in these instances, these courts point to
the length of the delay, the extent of the loss of evidence in support of
defendant's position, the unavailability of witnesses, and the notion
that allowing the private plaintiff to unreasonably delay the filing of a
Title VII claim may result in the prosecution of stale claims.117
Garrett v. General Motors Corp., decided in 1988 by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and Jeffries v. Chicago
Transit Auth., decided in 1985 by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, represent the latest statements of these circuits
on the question of the application of the defense of laches to bar a Title
VII claim when a private plaintiff chooses to await the completion of
lengthy EEOC proceedings before filing suit, and the defendant em
ployer proves undue prejudice as a result of the delay. I IS The follow
ing section discusses the classic laches approach and the rationales
relied upon in Garrett and Jeffries by the Courts of Appeals for the
Eighth and Seventh Circuits, respectively, in their decisions to apply
the defense of laches to the Title VII claims in those instances.
l.

Garrett v. General Motors Corp. I 19

In Garrett, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a pri
vate plaintiff's fourteen and one-half year delay in filing a Title VII
claim was unreasonable and inexcusable and that defendant's defense
had been prejudiced as a result. 120 The plaintiff in Garrett filed a race
discrimination charge with the EEOC in 1971. On July 22, 1985, the
EEOC issued the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter and plaintiff filed suit in
September, 1985. 121
At trial, plaintiff claimed to have contacted the EEOC office on
numerous occasions by phone and in person between 1972 and 1980.
In addition, testimony indicated that in 1983 plaintiff was informed by
the EEOC that the discrimination file had been destroyed. Although
evidence was offered at trial to attempt to reconstruct the EEOC's
processing of plaintiff's claims, the district court concluded that it was
116. Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 259 (1988); Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1987); Jeffries v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
117. Jeffries, 770 F.2d at 679-82; Whitfield, 820 F.2d at 245-46.
118. Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 259 (1988); Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
119. 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988).
120. .Jd. at 561-62.
121. Id. at 560-61.
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difficult to determine how the claim was actually processed. 122 Based
on its findings of fact, the district court found that plaintiff's "contact
with the EEOG was minimal" and that plaintiff "did not actively pur
sue his rights."'23 The district court concluded that plaintiff's claim
was barred by the doctrine of laches as a matter of law. 124
On appeal, plaintiff argued that a Title VII plaintiff's failure to
file a civil suit until completion of the EEOC administrative process
was not inexcusable and could not support the application of the
laches defense. 125 The court of appeals, however, emphatically dis
agreed. The court stated simply "that the doctrine of laches is a
proper defense in a Title VII action, and may be used to bar a lawsuit
where the plaintiff is guilty of (1) unreasonable and unexcused delay,
(2) resulting in prejudice to the defendant."126
In its determination, the court of appeals noted that the plaintiff's
file was improperly processed by the EEOC and that the plaintiff was
misinformed about the status of the case. 127 The court, however, also
considered the fact that plaintiff's minimal contact with the EEOC
and plaintiff's own delay caused prejudice to the defendant. 128 Based
on these findings, the court of appeals held that it was within the dis
trict court's discretion to apply the defense of laches under these
circumstances. 129
Id.
123. Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 657 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
124. Garrett, 844 F.2d at 561.
.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 562.
128. Id.
129. Id. See also Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th CiT. 1987).
In Whitfield, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dis
missal of a plaintiff's Title VII claim on the ground of laches, where the plaintiff filed suit
ten years after the claim was originally filed with the EEOC, but within the statutory time
following issuance of the right-to-sue letter. Id. at 246. The court agreed with the district
court's finding that the plaintiff unreasonably and inexcusably delayed infiljng suit and that
the employer was prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 244.
In Whitfield, the plaintiff filed a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC on
January 17, 1973. Thereafter, the EEOC commenced an investigation of the charge and
held a hearing in October, 1974. Following the hearing the claim remained dormant with
the EEOC until the EEOC issued the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter in July, 1983. Within
ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff filed suit iri district court. Based
on the depositions of two key defense witnesses who testified they could no longer recall the
events which led to the decision to terminate the plaintiff, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment based on laches. The district court granted the motion, ruling that the
Title VII claim was barred by the doctrine of laches, and the plaintiff appealed. /d.
In considering whether the case was a proper setting for the application of laches, the
court of appeals applied both prongs of the two-prong laches defense. To determine the
reasonableness of the delay, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered "both the
122.
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Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth.130

In Jeffries, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
plaintiff's Title VII claim, which was timely filed with the EEOC in
1974, was barred by the doctrine of laches. The court found that both
elements of the laches defense were present. The court stated that the
delay of over ten years in filing suit was inexcusable and the defendant
was prejudiced by such delay through its destruction of relevant
records. 131
In Jeffries, the plaintiff filed a race discrimination charge with the
EEOC on November 11, 1974. The defendant received notification of
the charge and responded on December 17, 1974, denying the allega
tion. Thereafter, the EEOC took no further action until June 9, 1982,
when it informed the defendant of its reasonable cause determination.
On July 28, 1982, the defendant requested reconsideration, which the
EEOC denied on September 24, 1982. The EEOC issued a right-to
sue letter to the employee on January 12, 1984, and on March 8, 1984,
the plaintiff filed suit. \32
The defendant moved for summary judgment based on the doc
trine of laches. In support of this motion, defendant submitted affida
vits indicating that several employees relevant to the defense had
either retired or were no longer in defendant's employ and that rele
vant employment and medical records had been destroyed as part of
the defendant's regular retention-destruction schedule. The district
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the
plaintiff appealed. 133
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that it would be contrary to the
policies reflected in Title VII to allow a claim to be barred by the
defense of laches prior to the completion of the EEOC's administrative
length of the delay and the plaintiff's reasons for the delay." [d. at 245. The court noted
that the plaintiff made no attempts to check on the status of his claim with the EEOC after
the October, 1974 hearing, and offered no meaningful explanation for his inaction. There
fore, the court concluded that the ten year delay was unexcused. In addition, considering
the facts of the case, the court also found the delay was unreasonable. As to the prejudice
resulting from the ten year delay, the court of appeals agreed that the impaired recollection
of the defendant's witnesses supported the finding of prejudice by the district court. [d. at
246. Having satisfied both elements of a laches defense, the court concluded that the doc
trine of laches was properly applied to bar the plaintiff's Title VII action in this case, even
though the plaintiff filed suit within the statutory time period after the EEOC finally issued
a right-to-sue letter. [d. at 245-46.
130. 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cerro denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
13 \. [d. at 679-82.
132. [d. at 678.
133. [d. at 678-79.
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process. 134 The court of appeals acknowledged the legislative and ju
dicial desire to resolve most complaints through the EEOC's adminis
trative process rather than litigation,135 but concluded that a plaintiff
does not have an absolute right to await the termination of EEOC
proceedings. 136 The court held that laches will bar a claim if the plain
tiff inexcusably delays in asserting it and the defendant has been mate
rially prejudiced as a result.137
The court of appeals found that the defendant satisfied both ele
ments of the laches defense. The court found that plaintiff's delay in
filing suit was inexcusable and that the delay resulted in undue preju
dice to the defendant. 138 In determining that the plaintiff's delay in
this case was both unreasonable and inexcusable, the court relied on
several factors including the apparent lack of activity on the plaintiff's
part and the fact that plaintiff had counsel for one year.139 On the
basis of these factors, the court concluded that the ten year delay was
"manifestly" unreasonable and plaintiff's reliance on the EEOC's ad
ministrative process was not excusable. l40
The court further determined that the element of prejudice was
clearly supported by the affidavits submitted by the defendant.141 On
this point, plaintiff argued that the defendant could not be prejudiced
by lack of records it destroyed or lost because it had a duty to retain
134. Id. at 681. The plaintiff argued "that it would be antithetical to Congress' 'pre
ferred' method of resolving Title VII claims if victims of discrimination could be guilty of
laches for allowing the EEOC's administrative process to run its course before filing suit in
federal court." Id. (citation omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 679-81.
138. Id. at 679-82.
139. Id. at 679-80. In finding that the plaintiff's delay was inexcusable, the court
relied on these factors:
1) [plaintiff] ... showed alacrity in filing the EEOC complaint ...;
2) he had counsel for one year;
3) he could not rule out that counsel had helped him with his EEOC claim;
4) it should have been apparent that no administrative resolution was imminent
long before 1982;
5) he could have requested a right-to-sue letter; and
6) he did nothing in the ten years between filing the charge and this suit.
Id. In addition, the court took note of an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff indicating that
he took no action because in 1975 certain EEOC agents advised him to do nothing about
the case until he heard from the EEOC. Id. at 679. Regardless of plaintiff's affidavit, the
court found that plaintiff's reliance on the EEOC could not excuse a delay of this length.
Id. at 680.
140. Id. at 680 ("[r]elying on the administrative process cannot excuse a delay of this
length").
141. Id.
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them under EEOC regulations. 142 The court, however, ruled that the
regulations could not be read as requiring the defendant to maintain
the records indefinitely, where the defendant had no notice of a contin
uing obligation to retain them. 143 Specifically the court noted that the
charge was filed in 1974, the defendant denied the charge, and then
heard nothing for eight years. l44
Based on the court's finding of inexcusable and unreasonable de
lay by the plaintiff and prejudice to the defendant, the court concluded
that the defendant had satisfied the requirements of the doctrine of
laches. The court determined that the defendant had established inex
cusable delay on the part of the employee and resulting prejudice as a
matter of law. The court, therefore, affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiff's Title VII claim based on laches. 145
The Garrett and Jeffries opinions best exemplify the decisions of
the classic laches courts which seek to limit the prejudice and incon
venience that can be placed upon a Title VII defendant because of the
private plaintiff's statutory right to rely on the EEOC's administrative
resolution of a Title VII claim. These courts characterize the doctrine
of laches as a readily available avenue for relieving unfair prejudice to
the defendant under these circumstances.
C.

The Private Plaintiff's Right To Rely On The EEOC's
Administrative Resolution Of Title VII Claims: The
Presumption Courts
The courts that grant the private plaintiff the presumption that

142. [d. at 681. The EEOC requires employers, employment agencies, and labor
organizations to make and preserve certain employment records and to make certain re
ports concerning their employment activities and practices. The EEOC is empowered to
impose such requirements by 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-8(c) (1982). In addition, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1602.14(a) (1988) requires an employer to keep employment records which are relevant
to a Title VII discrimination charge until the date of expiration of the statutory period
within which an action may be filed or, if an action is filed, on its termination date. The
EEOC also requires an employer to keep for at least six months alI personnel records that
are made. [d. The records that must be kept are those made in connection with job appli
cants, hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, layoffs, rates of pay, and other forms of com
pensation. [d.. If an employee is discharged, the employer must keep his or her personnel
record for six months from the date of discharge. [d. For the provisions of 29 C.F.R.
§ 1602.14, see infra note 200.
143. Jeffries, 770 F.2d at 681. See also Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609
F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979). The Boone court held that U[i]n the absence of any type of
continuing administrative proceedings ... , we do not believe that Mechanical was under
an affirmative obligation to prepare for a lawsuit which would be filed seven years after the
incident giving rise to it occurred." [d. at 960 (footnote omitted).
144. Jeffries, 770 F.2d at 681.
145. [d. at 682.
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they are entitled to indefinitely await the termination of the EEOC's
administrative process generally find that it is reasonable for an ag
grieved employee to allow the EEOC to retain jurisdiction over a Title
VII action. The conviction to which these authorities give voice-that
a Title VII plaintiff should not be penalized for pursuing administra
tive avenues of relief-is premised on the strong federal policy which
favors the avoidance of private suits by encouraging claimants to rely
on the EEOC administrative procedures. In addition, these courts
find that the Title VII remedial scheme would be frustrated were the
defense of laches to be allowed. 146 These courts characterize the pri
vate remedy allowed by Title VIII47 as an alternative method for pri
vate plaintiffs to obtain relief from discrimination. In support of this
contention, the courts point to the legislative analysis of the 1972
amendment of Title VII as evidence of the strong federal policy favor
ing reliance on the EEOC's resolution of disputes. 148
Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 149 decided in 1979 by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Howard v. Roadway Ex
press, Inc.,lso decided in 1984 by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, best illustrate the position of the courts
which, as a general rule, grant the Title VII private plaintiff the pre
146. As stated in Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal.
1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981):
[Plaintiff's] reliance on the EEOC to conciliate her dispute with United can
not be characterized as lack of diligence on her part in view of the strong federal
policy favoring such reliance. She cannot be found chargeable with neglect which
would bar her right to bring this action when, trusting in the good offices and
promise of her government to seek resolution of her complaint, she commits that
grievance to its care .
. . . EEOC's conciliation efforts, "regardless of the time taken," are designed
to aid in effectuation of remedy. The court will not find that its procedure has in
this instance prevented it.
Id. at 1228. Accord Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976).
147. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982).
148. See Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 19&4).
In Howard, the court of appeals observed that Congress' preference for the administrative
resolution of claims was reflected in the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to Title
VII:
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the
rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices
of the EEOC .... However, as the individual's right[J to redress are [sic] para
mount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenlies be left
open for quick and effective relief.
Id. at 1532 (quoting 118 CONGo REc. 7563, 7565 (Conference Report on H.R. 1746, Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972».
149. 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979).
150. 726 F.2d 1529 (lith Cir. 1984).
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sumptive right to await the conclusion of EEOC proceedings before
filing suit, with an exception only in rare cases. 151 The following sec
tion discusses the rationales relied upon in Bernard and Howard by the
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, in
establishing the general rule.
1.

The General Rule: Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co. and Howard v.
Roadway Express, Inc.

In Bernard, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that in or
der for the doctrine of laches to bar a Title VII action, it must be
found both that the plaintiff delayed inexcusably in bringing suit and
that the delay unduly prejudiced the defendant. The court, however,
cautioned that a Title VII private plaintiff cannot be penalized for
choosing to forego the alternative of privately bringing suit and "elect
ing instead the legislatively and judicially favored method of relying
on the administrative processes of the EEOC."ls2
In Bernard, the plaintiffs failed to file their Title VII claims in
federal court until completion of the EEOC process, some nine years
after their original EEOC complaint. ls3 The only justification offered
by the plaintiffs for this delay was their asserted right to await termi
nation of the EEOC process. IS4 The court considered whether the
plaintiffs failure to file the Title VII claims until after the completion
of the EEOC's administrative process and conciliation efforts was un
reasonable and inexcusable. ISS
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of
laches did not bar the Title VII claim commenced by the private plain
tiffs nine years after the filing of discrimination charges with the
EEOC. In its determination, the court noted that the EEOC actively
pursued the administrative process and conciliation efforts with the
defendant company for almost all of the nine years. The court also
considered the fact that the EEOC's efforts ultimately resulted in a
conciliation agreement between the EEOC and the defendant. 156
The court observed that although the plaintiffs had received no
151. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties
Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979). See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text for a
discussion of such a rare case.
152. 596 F.2d at 1257.
153. [d. at 1253.
154. [d. at 1256.
155. [d.
156. [d. at 1253-57.
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tice from the EEOC that they could request a right-to-sue letter four
teen months before the plaintiffs actually did request their right-to-sue
letter, the EEOC had continued conciliation efforts up until one
month prior to the plaintiffs' request. 157 The court concluded, there
fore, that the plaintiffs' failure to file their Title VII claims until the
completion of the EEOC's active, continuing administrative process
was not inexcusable delay and subsequently failed to satisfy the re
quirements of the defense of laches. 158
157. Id. at 1253.
158. Id. at 1257. See also Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 8\0 (9th Cir.
1985). In Brown, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that lengthy delays by the
EEOC "are not to be charged against private plaintiffs and that complainants are not re
quired to terminate the administrative process by requesting a notice of right-to-sue." Id.
at 815. The court acknowledged that this circuit had previously applied the doctrine of
laches as a defense against a private plaintiff in a Title VII action, but held that the prior
court's holding "stated the exception and not the general rule." Id. at 814. See Boone v.
Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979).
The plaintiff in Brown filed two charges of employment discrimination with the
EEOC. The first charge alleged racial discrimination in a training program and was filed in
July, 1977. The second charge alleged discrimination in plaintiff's termination and was
filed in November, 1978. Id. at 812. The EEOC commenced an investigation on the sec
ond charge prior to the first charge, alleging discrimination in training. The EEOC, how
ever, dismissed the termination charge in December, 1983, due to plaintiff's failure to
respond to EEOC correspondence. A right-to-sue letter was thereafter issued to the plain
tiff on January 26, 1983, regarding the discrimination in termination charge. The plaintiff
did not file a civil action within the required ninety days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter.
Id.
Subsequently, the EEOC commenced an investigation on the discrimination in train
ing charge. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe the allega
tions were true and, thereafter, made conciliation attempts with Continental. When
conciliation efforts failed, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to plaintiff on November
17, 1983. Id. Thereupon the plaintiff filed suit within the 90-day limitation period pre
scribed by statute. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged discrimination in termination.
Continental moved to dismiss the action, and the district court granted the motion, dis
missing the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice because of the failure to file within ninety
days of receipt of the January 26, 1983 right-to-sue letter issued on the termination charge.
The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the complaint to the court of appeals. Id.
First the court of appeals determined that since the plaintiff filed the action within
ninety days of a valid right-to-sue letter issued upon a prior, reasonably related incident of
discrimination by the same employer, the plaintiff should be allowed to amend the com
plaint to allege discrimination in training as well as discrimination in termination. The
court further determined that the complaint, as amended, would be timely filed and there
fore should not have been dismissed as untimely. Id. at 813-14.
Continental contended that the district court's order should be affirmed on the alterna
tive ground that the plaintiff's Title VII claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. In
support of this claim, Continental presented affidavits alleging prejudice through loss of
witnesses and the loss of plaintiff's personnel file. Id. at 814-15. The court, however, found
that the plaintiff did not deliberately delay seeking a right-to-sue letter and further noted
that Continental was on notice from the filing of the initial charge up to the issuance of the
November 17, 1983 right-to-sue letter that it would be required to preserve whatever

1989]

LACHES AS A DEFENSE

269

In Howard, like Bernard, the court of appeals was confronted
with the issue "whether plaintifll's] failure to file a private action until
after the termination of the EEOC's active, continuing administrative
process is unreasonable."159 Like the plaintiffs in Bernard, the private
plaintiff in Howard asserted the right to await completion of the
EEOC's administrative resolution of the Title VII claims. 160 Howard
filed a Title VII race discrimination charge with the EEOC in Decem
ber, 1976. 161 The defendant, Roadway, acknowledged receipt of the
charge in January, 1977. In 1978, Howard's attorney requested a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and then later withdrew the re
quest. In December, 1981, five years after the initial charge was filed,
the EEOC made a "no cause" determination and issued Howard a
right-to-sue letter. Howard filed a claim in federal court in March of
1982, within the required 90-day period after receiving the right-to-sue
letter. 162 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that
laches could be applied to Title VII actions brought by private plain
tiffs, but saw no reason to make that exception under these circum
stances and, therefore, held that Howard's failure to file his Title VII
claim until the termination of the EEOC process was not inexcusable
records it deemed necessary for its defense. Based on these facts, the court declined to
affirm the district court's decision. [d. at 815.
The court, therefore, held that its prior decision in Boone v. Mechanical Specialties
Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979), was not dispositive in this case. See infra note 178 for a
discussion of the Boone decision. In fact, the court emphasized that Boone represented the
exception to the general rule that the Title VII private plaintiff may rely on the EEOC's
administration of Title VII claims. 765 F.2d at 814-15. See also Gifford v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Ordinarily, if the EEOC retains control
over a charge, a private plaintiff will not be charged with its mistakes."); Watson v. Gulf &
Western Indus., 650 F.2d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A Title VII complainant is not
charged with the commission's failure to perform its statutory duties.") (quoting Russell v.
American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935
(1976»; Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 667 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980).
159. Howard, 726 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bernard, 596 F.2d
1249, 1256 (5th Cir. 1979».
160. 726 F.2d at 1532.
161. [d. at 1531.
162. [d. The court refused to distinguish this case from Bernard on the ground that
in this instance the EEOC made a "no-cause" determination. [d. at 1533, n.2. In such a
case, the court stated that "[a] plaintiff may not be faulted for relying on the administrative
process prior to the issuance of a no-reasonable-cause determination, for there remains the
potential that the EEOC investigation will result in conciliation or prosecution on the
EEOC's part." [d.
This holding is consistent with Congress' expressed preference for the administrative
resolution of claims as reflected in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act. [d. at
1532. It is also consistent with the Bernard conclusion that relying on the EEOC's admin
istrative processes is the judicially favored method. [d. at 1533.
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delay and could not support the defense of laches. 163
The Bernard and Howard decisions support the general rule that
private plaintiffs are not required to terminate the administrative pro
cess by requesting a right-to-sue letter and may await the termination
of EEOC proceedings before filing suit in a federal court. l64 These
opinions are representative of the presumption which courts, in the
absence of an exception, generally allow the private plaintiff to await
termination of EEOC proceedings before filing suit.
2.

An Exception To The General Rule: Cleveland Newspaper
Guild, ~ocal 1 v. Plain Dealer Publishing CO.165
.

In the wake of the disagreement among the courts of appeals as to
whether the application of equitable principles to Title VII cases per
mits a dismissal based on laches when a claimant chooses to await the
termination of EEOC proceedings, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled on the issue in Cleveland Newspaper. A sharply divided court of
appeals held that a union that delayed filing in federal court for ten
years while employment discrimination charges were pending at the
EEOC is precluded by the defense of laches from pursuing its claim in
court. 166
163. Id. at 1533. Note that in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent
all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October I, 1981. Bernard,
therefore, is binding on the Howard court.
. .
164. See also Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199,211 (4th Cir. 1984), cerro de
nied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985) ("decision to rely on the commission's administrative process
before initiating a private suit is not inexcusable delay"); Rozen V. District of Colu~bia,
702 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
165. Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d
1147 (6th Cir.), cerro denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988).
166. /d. at 1155. In Cleveland Newspaper, the Cleveland Newspaper Guild (Guild)
filed a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC on behalf of the Guild's female members
on April 12, 1972. One month later the employer was notified of the charge by means of a
form notice which did not name the persons who brought the charge, but stated that an
EEOC regulation requires the employer to preserve all relevant personnel records until the
charge is resolved. [d. at 1149.
In 1974, the EEOC sent the Guild a form notice entitled "Charging Party Follow-up,"
which informed the Guild that the EEOC had not been able to process the charge and
could not predict when it would begin to do so. The Guild was given the choice of keeping
the charge open and having it processed when the EEOC could attend to it, suing the
employer in federal court, or closing the charge without further action. The Guild elected
to have the EEOC process the charge. [d.
The EEOC's investigation began in May, 1976. At that time, the EEOC gave the
employer a copy of the original charge which had been filed by the Guild on April 12, 1972.
Upon receipt of the charge, the Plain Dealer requested that the EEOC dismiss the claim,
asserting that the delay had substantially impaired its ability to respond. The EEOC re
fused to dismiss the charge and, in June of 1976, requested that the Plain Dealer supply it

1989]

LACHES AS A DEFENSE

271

The issue considered by the en bane panel of the Sixth Circuit
.Court of Appeals was whether the application of equitable principles
to Title VII cases permits a dismissal based on laches when a claimant
chooses to await the termination of EEOC proceedings before filing
suit. Specifically, the court considered whether a claimant who awaits
the outcome of the EEOC's administrative proceedings for a period of
ten years before filing suit has caused inexcusable or unreasonable de
iay and prejudice to the employer sufficient to justify the application of
the doctrine of laches.
In an 11-5 ruling, the court of appeals held that the ten year lapse
between the union's filing of a sex discrimination charge with the
EEOC and the filing of its Title VII suit constituted an unreasonable
delay which prejudiced the employer's ability to defend itself against
the Title VII charge. 167 The court ruled that the Title VII suit was,
therefore, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. 168
The court of appeals began by analyzing other federal courts of
appeals' decisions which had decided the laches issue in similar cir
cumstances. 169 Based on an examination of each court to have consid
ered the question, the Cleveland Newspaper court concluded that the
doctrine of laches should apply to Title VII proceedings "in practice
with documents and information regarding employees for the previous six years. The Plain
Dealer refused to submit the requested information and the EEOC thereafter issued the
employer a subpoena. The Plain Dealer immediately filed a petition seeking revocation
and/or modification of the EEOC subpoena. One year later, the EEOC denied revocation
and the employer then informed the EEOC it would not appear. Nothing further occurred
until 1979 when the Guild wrote the EEOC concerning the status of the charge. Then in
1980, the EEOC informed the Plain Dealer that it would not seek to enforce the 1976
subpoena. Id. at 1149-50.
On July 3, 1980, the employer responded to the Guild's charge and contended that
because of the lapse of time, personnel and documents relevant to the charge were no
longer available. On October 10, 1980, the EEOC issued a finding of reasonable cause and
thereafter attempted to commence conciliation efforts. The attempts proved fruitless, and
on May 21, 1982, ten years after the Guild filed its charge with the EEOC, the EEOC
issued the Guild a right-to-sue letter. The Guild then filed suit. Id. at 1150.
The Plain Dealer filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative
defense of laches. The trial court found plaintiff's delay in filing suit inexcusable and that
the delay resulted in prejudice to the defendant in the form of unavailable witnesses, de
struction of documentary evidence, and erosion of available witnesses' memories. The
court, therefore, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the Guild
appealed. On appeal, a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 813 F.2d 101
(6th Cir. 1987). On rehearing en bane, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
decision. 839 F.2d 1147, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1988).
167. Id. at 1154-55. Judge Guy wrote the majority opinion joined by three members
of the court. Judges Lively, Merritt and Nelson each wrote separate concurring opinions.
Judge Milburn dissented in an opinion joined by Judges Edwards, Keith and Jones.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1151-53.
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as well as theory."17o The court acknowledged that the EEOC's ad
ministrative resolution of Title VII claims is the preferred method, but
concluded that "in rare cases, the only avenue for relieving unfair prej
udice to the defendant is dismissal of the plaintiff's claim,"171 on the
basis of the doctrine of laches. 172
In concluding that laches applied in this particular circumstance,
170. Id. at 1153.
171. Id.
172. In a powerful dissent, Judge Milburn contended that section 706(f)(1) of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act and the policies it reflects precluded the invocation of the
equitable doctrine of laches where the Title VII claimant elects to await completion of the
EEOC's processing of the charge and the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. Id. at 1157.
Judge Milburn proclaimed that "[c]ourts may not invoke the doctrine oflaches where to do
so would be inconsistent with national policies and priorities established by Congress." Id.
at 1158 (citation omitted). The dissent premised its argument on a literal reading of section
706(f)(I) and on the recognition of the federal policy favoring the administrative resolution
of employment discrimination claims before suit is brought in federal court. Specifically,
the dissent argued that the mandatory language of section 706(f)(1) does not require a
charging party to request a right-to-sue letter within a certain time, or at all. The literal
language of section 706(f)(I) leads to the conclusion that after one hundred and eighty
days have elapsed "the [charging party] may either file a private action within 90 days after
EEOC notification or continue to leave the ultimate resolution of his charge to the efforts of
the EEOC." /d. at 1159 (Milburn, J., dissenting) (quoting Occidental Life Ins. v. EEOC,
432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977». The dissent argued further that "Congress expressly intended
that recourse to a civil action would 'be the exception and not the rule, and that the vast
majority of complaints [would] be handled through the offices of the [EEOq.''' Id. at
1158 (Milburn, J., dissenting) (quoting 118 CONGo REc. 7563, 7565 (1972) (Conference
Report on H.R. 1746, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972». Judge Milburn
further argued that the legislative history "evinces that Congress did not intend the charg
ing party's statutory right to await termination of EEOC proceedings to be emasculated by
.
lengthy EEOC delays." Id. at 1159.
See also Cleveland Newspaper, 839 F.2d at 1162 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith
concurred in Judge Milburn's dissenting opinion, and in a separate opinion stressed the
irony of granting a Title VII defendant equitable relief:
[I]t strikes me as ironic that plaintiff is being penalized for fully exhausting its
administrative remedies-pursuant to a complex and comprehensive statutory
scheme-rather than resorting to the courts for relief, while this Court, as well as
the courts of most other jurisdictions, have been consistently unsympathetic. to
plaintiffs who seek judicial relief prior to exhaustion even as a reaction to demon
strably lengthy and time-consuming administrative procedures. Indeed, the re
quirement that one exhaust all administrative remedies has been intoned with
such frequency, despite the hardship for plaintiffs which can result, as to have
become liturgically axiomatic.
Id. See also Cleveland Newspaper, 839 F.2d at 1163 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ag
grieved filed their complaints with the EEOC in a timely manner. By engrafting a laches
defense onto the statute this court majority is doing the opposite of what Congress in
tended."). See also Cleveland Newspaper, 839 F.2d at 1163 (Edwards, J., dissenting) ("In
my view of this case the majority opinion simply amends the statute to provide a time
limitation not adopted by Congress and not justified in equity.").
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the court pointed to the following factors as sufficient support for the
district court's finding of inexcusable delay by the plaintiff:
1) plaintiff's knowledge of its ability to obtain a right-to-sue letter
and institute a civil action;
2) plaintiff's specific knowledge and responsibility in EEOC
matters;
3) plaintiff's lack of activity over the eight year period;
4) plaintiff's lack of contact with the EEOC during that period;
5) the EEOC's lack of activity during this time which could ex
plain plaintiff's failure to act;
6) the EEOC's failure to take enforcement action on the subpoena
issued to the defendant; and
7) the lack of a conciliation agreement between the plaintiff and
defendant. 173

Relying on these factors, the Cleveland Newspaper court affirmed the
district court's finding that the plaintiff's lack of diligence in filing suit
was inexcusable. 174
In concluding that plaintiff's inexcusable delay caused prejudice
to the defendant, the court relied on the employer's affidavits which
detailed the loss of key defense witnesses and relevant documentary
evidence. The plaintiff did not dispute the finding of prejudice, but
contended that the prejudice the defendant suffered resulted from its
own error. Specifically, plaintiff argued that the defendant had re
ceived notice that a sex discrimination charge had been filed with the
EEOC and that the defendant was ordered to retain all relevant
records. 175 In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals agreed
with the district court that the EEOC notice to the defendant was too
ambiguous to serve as a valid command. The court reasoned that the
defendant did not know which personnel files were relevant because it
did not receive a copy of the charge until four years after it was filed
with the EEOC. 176 The court noted further that even if the defendant
had retained all of the relevant records, that still would not have re
duced the amount of prejudice to defendant, due to witnesses who
were no longer available or whose memories had faded. 177
173. Id. at 1154.
174. /d. The court further noted that the EEOC's actions are only one factor consid
ered by the court in assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's actions. The court must
still make its determination based on whether the plaintiff's own delay or lack of diligence
is inexcusable. Id. at 1153-54.
175. Id.atI154.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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On the basis of all the facts presented, the Cleveland Newspaper
court found no abuse of discretion in the di/itrict court's dismissal of
the plaintiff's Title VII claim. More importantly, however, the court
recognized the "understandable" reluctance courts have shown to dis
miss Title VII claims and limited the defense of laches to "rare
cases." 178
The Bernard and Howard opmlons, discussed above, represent
178. Id. at 1153. See also Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th
Cir. 1979). In Boone, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that laches may be
used as a defense to a Title VII action. The court found that a plaintiff who delayed filing
in federal court for almost seven years while charges were pending at the EEOC, was pre
cluded by the defense of laches from pursuing the claim in court. Specifically, the court
determined that the plaintiff's delay was unreasonable and defendant employer was se
verely prejudiced as a result. Id. at 959·60. In its conclusion, however, the court empha
sized that the finding in this case "state[d] the exception and not the general rule." Id. at
960.
In this case, the plaintiff filed a racial discrimination charge with the EEOC in Octo
ber, 1969, alleging wrongful termination. The charge remained pending with the EEOC for
nearly seven years, until plaintiff requested and received a right-to-sue letter on August 3,
1976. Plaintiff filed suit in a federal district court in December, 1976. Id. at 957.
The district court entered an order dismissing the plaintiff's action on the merits. Spe
cifically, the district court found that "[b]ecause [plaintiff's] substantial delay in bringing
this action was inexcusable and has resulted in severe prejudice to [the defendant em
ployer], [defendant] is entitled to a dismissal of this action under the doctrine of laches."
Id. at 958 (quoting from the district court's finding below).
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant should have been on notice of the
Title VII claim because the charge had remained on the books over all those years. In
addition, plaintiff contended that the defendant could have preserved the testimony of the
lost witnesses and avoided the prejudice which resulted with the passage of time. Id. at
959.
The issue considered by the court of appeals was whether laches or an unreasonable
delay may bar a Title VII claim. In concluding that laches applied in this particular cir
cumstance, the court pointed to the following factors as sufficient support for the district
court's finding of inexcusable delay by the plaintiff:
I) plaintiff's knowledge of its right to request and receive a right-to-sue
letter and bring an action in federal court at an earlier time;
2) plaintiff's failure to request such right-to-sue letter;
3) plaintiff's rejection of the EEOC's earlier offers of right-to-sue letters;
and
4) the lack of evidence from which the court could infer an excuse for the
delay.
Id. at 957-59. Based on these factors, the court of appeals concluded that the district court
was correct in finding that the plaintiff's delay was unreasonable. The court further stated
that "Title VII clearly cannot countenance the type of delay which occurred in the present
case." Id. at 959.
In concluding that the plaintiff's unreasonable delay resulted in prejudice to the de
fendant, the court relied on the evidence offered by the defendant detailing the loss of
defense witnesses and relevant personnel files. In addition, the court stated that "[i]n the
absence of any type of continuing administrative proceedings (as opposed to a sleeping
claim)," the defendant was not under an affirmative duty to avoid the prejudice. Id. at 960.
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prime examples of the court decisions which grant Title VII plaintiffs
the presumption that they are entitled to await the completion of the
EEOC's administration of a claim before filing suit, as opposed to
favoring the application of the doctrine of laches to the Title VII
claims. These courts encourage the informal conciliation of Title VII
claims through the office of the EEOC and allow the defense of laches
only in rare circumstances where no other avenue for relief exists.
Cleveland Newspaper is one such "rare case" in which the Sixth Cir
cuit Court of Appeals stated the exception and not the general rule.
Conversely, the Garrett and Jeffries opinions, discussed in the
preceding section, are representative of the courts which take the clas
sic laches approach and readily apply the doctrine of laches to bar
Title VII claimants from indefinitely awaiting the conclusion of EEOC
proceedings. These classic laches cases, when compared and con
trasted with the presumption cases, exemplify the basic dispute which
exists among the federal courts of appeals on the question of the appli
cability of the doctrine of laches when a plaintiff awaits the completion
of EEOC proceedings before filing suit. In light of the preceding dis
cussion, this comment will propose an appropriate resolution of the
laches issue.
IV.

AN EQUITABLE ALTERNATIVE To THE LACHES DISMISSAL

The various decisions of the courts of appeals, discussed above,
illustrate that the status of a Title VII claimant's right to indefinitely
delay bringing suit until the completion of EEOC proceedings varies
among the courts considering this issue. Viable arguments for and
against the application of the equitable doctrine of laches in such cir
cumstances are not hard to make. On one hand, one can reasonably
argue that a Title VII claimant's patience in awaiting completion of
conciliation efforts is not to be considered unreasonable or inexcusable
in light of the "federal policy requiring employment discrimination
claims to be ... , whenever possible, administratively resolved before
suit is brought in a federal court."179 Conversely, it is just as reason
able to make the argument, in pursuance of equity, that the Title VII
claimant's statutory rights under section 706 of the Civil Rights Act
are outweighed by the defendant's right to defend against a Title VII
Thus, the court held that the district court did not err in the finding of prejudice to the
defendant. Id.
On the basis of all the facts presented, the Boone court found no clear error in the
district court's finding of unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff and prejudice to the
defendant. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. Id. at 959-60.
179. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977).
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claim without undue prejudice. ISO
The conflict between the courts is plain. It is also apparent that
these courts disagree as to what point in time the length of the delay
between the plaintiff's initial filing of a charge with the EEOC and
subsequent bringing of a suit in federal district court becomes unrea
sonable or inexcusable. The practical result of this lack of established
guidelines has been for the federal courts of appeals to make ad hoc
determinations based on the particular circumstances of each case.
While there appears to be no bright-line rule to apply to this ques
tion, there exists an equitable alternative to circumvent the result.
When the doctrine of laches is applied to a Title VII claim, the defense
acts as a bar, and the ultimate consequence is dismissal. This result is
contrary to the central statutory purposes of Title VII to eradicate
discrimination and make persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination. Conversely, when the application of the doctrine
of laches to a Title VU claim is denied, the consequence is that the
employer is unduly prejudiced in making a defense. This result is con
trary to the fundamental concept of fairness and equity.
In light of the resulting conflicts, there appears to be an alterna
tive which balances the various equities between the parties and
reaches a result which is both consistent with the purposes of Title VII
and the concept of fairness. Specifically, an alternative method, more
appropriate and perhaps more effective than the laches dismissal,
would be to use the laches defense to decrease exposure to back pay
liability. lSI
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit suggested in EEOC
180. Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. de
nied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
181. The principal relief to a Title VII plaintiff is the back pay award, "which serves
to compensate the victim for the renumerati'on ... lost as a result of the unlawful act and to
deter future violations of the act." C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOY
MENT DISCRIMINATION part V at I (2d ed. 1988). The back pay period commences on the
date the alleged unlawful employment discrimination occurred. Id. § 14.4.3, at 19. How
ever, an employer is not liable for back pay for any period prior to two years before the
charge was filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Furthermore, the back
pay period normally ends on the date the court enters judgment for the plaintiff and orders
reinstatement, employment, or promotion. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 14.4.3 at 21 (2d ed. 1988). But see Kamberos v. GTE
Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981);
Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc.,.564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977). See infra notes 191-96 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Lynn and Kamberos cases. Specifically, 42
U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) provides: "Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than
two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts
earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." Id.
'
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v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 182 even if a district court finds that
the elements of laches have been proven, the district court in the exer
cise of its discretion, "must take into account whether or not a less
drastic form of equitable relief than a complete dismissal of the action
would have been more appropriate."183 In Great Atlantic, the court
further suggested that prior references by the Supreme Court "to the
district court's power to afford protection from prejudice arising from
delays in prosecution may well speak only to the discretion which 42
U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) ... affords respecting the imposition of back pay
liability rather than other forms of prospective equitable relief."184
The statutory authority for making awards of back pay in Title
VII cases is cast in language that emphasizes flexibility and discretion
in fashioning an appropriate remedy:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such af
firmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. 185
182. 735 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1984). In Great Atlantic, the EEOC appealed from a sum
mary judgment in favor of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. The district court
held that the EEOC's complaint, which sought injunctive relief and back pay, must be
dismissed on the ground of laches. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the defense of laches was not available in view of the fact that there was no inexcusable
delay in the administrative process. Id. at 84-85.
183. Id. at 81. In addition, "[t]he court's discretion must also be exercised commen
surately with Congress' purpose that the [EEOC's] capacity to investigate charges of dis
crimination not be undermined." Id.
184. Id. at 80 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977),
and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1975». See Occidental, 432
U.S. at 373 (back pay may be denied or restricted when delay by EEOC in bringing action
handicaps defendant significantly); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 424-'25 (back pay may be re
stricted or denied when private plaintiff's unexcused conduct prejudices defendant).
185. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (emphasis added). The fact that Congress pro
vided the courts with this equitable power indicates the purpose of Title VII to make per
sons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. The
"make whole" purpose of Title VII is made evident by the legislative history. 118 CONGo
REc. 7166, 7168 (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 - Conference Report); 118
CONGo REc. 7563, 7565 (Conference Report on H.R. 1746, Equal Employment Opportu
nity Act of 1972). In fact, a section-by-section analysis accompanying the Conference
Committee Report on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 clearly stated the
"make whole" purpose of Title VII:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion
exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. In
dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of
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The general principles governing the award of back pay under the Ti
tle VII back pay provision were enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody; 186 the Court stated that the discretion
accorded by Title VII's back pay provision, while equitable in nature,
must be exercised in light of the deterrence and "make whole" pur
poses of Title VII. Thus, "given a finding of unlawful discrimination,
backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally,
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating dis
crimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination."187
The Albemarle Court specifically considered the application of
this principle in the context of the equitable defense of laches. Despite
the legislative emphasis on the "make whole" purpose of Title VII and
in light of the statutory emphasis on discretion, the Court held that a
Title VII plaintiff "may not be 'entitled' to relief if its conduct of the
cause has improperly and substantially prejudiced the other party." 188
Furthermore, the Albemarle Court held that "[t]o deny backpay be
cause a particular cause has been prosecuted in an eccentric fashion,
prejudicial to the other party, does not offend the broad purposes of
Title VII."189 In effect, the Court concluded that the district court's
denial of back pay was within its discretionary power, in light of the
circumstances peculiar to the case. 190
In two appellate decisions, a private plaintiff's delay in filing suit
was used as the basis for reducing the back pay award pursuant to the
defense of laches. 191 In both cases, the plaintiff allowed a discrimina
tion charge to remain before the EEOC long after entitled to a right
to-sue letter and after the EEOC had ceased conciliation efforts. In
Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc.,192 the Title VII plaintiff perrelief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims 'of unlawful
discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests not only
upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice complained
of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.

Id.
186. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
187. Id.at421.
188. Id. at 424.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981); Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.
1977).
192. 603 F.2d 598 (1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981).
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mitted a discrimination claim to lie dormant with the EEOC for over
four years, despite the fact that she was a lawyer and knew that she
could request a right-to-sue letter one hundred and eighty days after
the filing of the complaint. In light of these circumstances, the Sev
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's award of back
pay should have been reduced by subtracting from the end of the back
pay period, an amount of time equivalent to the time between the expi
ration of the ISO-day period and the date when the right-to-sue letter
was actually received by the plaintiff. 193
In Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc. ,194 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that "where the aggrieved party has consulted counsel
and is aware of this right [to request a right-to-sue letter], it becomes
inequitable at some point for the employee to delay filing SUit."195 The
court further stated that "it is proper for the district court, in the exer
cise of its equitable discretion, to take the plaintiff's lack of diligence
into account in determining the amount of back pay, if any, to be
awarded the plaintiff should he prevail on the merits."l96
As these cases illustrate, in particular cases where the Title VII
defendant is in fact prejudiced by a plaintiff's unreasonable or unex
cused delay in filing suit while waiting for the termination of EEOC
proceedings, the district courts can use their discretion and limit the
back pay relief to a period of reasonable diligence. This remedy in
effect allows the Title VII plaintiff to proceed on the merits of the
employment discrimination claim. 197 Furthermore, the result is rec
oncilable with the purpose of Title VII: the Title VII plaintiff is made
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment dis
crimination and the employer is enjoined from engaging in the unlaw
ful employment practice. The result is also in accordance with the
equitable concept of fairness: the Title VII defendant's liability is lim
ited to a reasonable period consistent with the equitable doctrine of .
laches.
Under this approach, the elements of the laches defense are the
same. The result, however, is a less draconian remedy than dismissal.
Ultimately, if the district court finds that the Title VII defendant has
193. Id. at 603.
194. 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977).
195. Id. at 1287.
196. /d. at 1288.
197. In the event the Title VII plaintiff's claim is without merit and the defendant
prevails, the court has the authority to assess a reasonable attorney's fee against the plain
tiff. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) provides: "[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ." 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e-5(k).
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satisfied both elements of the laches defense (namely, that the delay by
the plaintiff is unreasonable and the defendant has been prejudiced in
making a defense), it is in the court's discretion to determine the ap
propriate equitable relief.
The determination of such equitable relief in Title VII cases
hinges on the balancing of the concerns of both parties and the result
must reflect the policies of Title VII and the essential element of fair
ness. Limiting back pay to a period of reasonably diligent pursuit
would be consistent with the equitable nature of the doctrine of
laches. 19B In addition, because the filing of any charge with the EEOC
places an employer on notice of the potential liability and consequent
need to preserve testimony, dismissal would seldom l99 be appropriate
198. It is also consistent with the equitable nature of the laches defense for the dis
trict court's determination of the period of "reasonably diligent pursuit" to be made on an
ad hoc basis, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Guided by this ad hoc
standard, the district courts may determine the amount of back pay relief appropriate in
each case.
For example, in Garrett v. General Motors Corp., the Distnct Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri had determined that the plaintiff's contact with the EEOC was mini
mal between 1972 and 1980, and that the plaintiff did not actively pursue the discrimina
tion claim until 1984. 844 F.2d at 562. Under such circumstances, the district court could
take the plaintiff~s lack of diligence into account in determining the amount of back pay to
be awarded. Specifically, the court could subtract, from the end of the back pay period, an
amount of time equivalent to the time between 1972 and 1984 that the plaintiff showed a
lack of diligence in the pursuit of the employment discrimination claim. Id. See supra
notes 119-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap
peals' decision in Garrett.
Similarly, in Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois had determined that the delay which barred this claim dated from the
time the plaintiff spoke with the EEOC in 1975 and the time plaintiff filed suit in 1984. 770
F.2d at 679-80. Applying the back pay limitation approach under these circumstances, the
district court could subtract, from the end of the back pay period, an amount of time
equivalent to the time between 1975 and 1984 that the plaintiff showed a lack of diligence.
Id. See supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Jeffries.
As these cases illustrate, the determination of the appropriate relief in Title VII cases
hinges on a balancing of the various equities between the parties. In addition, the result of
the district court's limitation of the back pay relief awarded, should the plaintiff prevail on
the merits, is consistent with the "make whole" purposes of Title VII and the fundamental
concept of fairness.
199. It should be noted that in Cleveland Newspaper, the court found that the
EEOC's notice to the defendant to retain personnel records "was too ambiguous to serve as
a valid command." 839 F.2d at 1154. That notice, however, did not name the person or
persons bringing the charge. Additionally, the notice asked that the defendant withhold
any questions about the complaint until the EEOC's investigation began. Four years later,
the defendant received a copy of the charge filed by the plaintiff. Under these circum
stances, the court found that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the four year delay
that occurred before the defendant received a copy of the charge. Moreover, the court
determined that prior to receiving an actual copy of the charge, it would be "impossible to
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because any prejudice could have been mitigated. 2 °O Moreover, limit
ing back pay in particular circumstances where the delay by the em
ployee significantly handicaps the employer is consistent with the
broad purposes of Title VII.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, using the defense of laches as a method to decrease
exposure to liability rather than as a complete dismissal of a Title VII
action provides for an equitable method for balancing the competing
concerns between the Title VII plaintiff and defendant. Although the
doctrine of laches has been applied to bar a Title VII claimant from
indefinitely awaiting the conclusion of EEOC proceedings before filing
suit, in the future laches should seldom be recognized as a complete
bar to a Title VII lawsuit. Instead, Title VII claims should be decided
on the merits; the laches defense will prove useful to decrease potential
liability and will allow the courts to reach "a just result" without' lim
determine which personnel records were 'relevant' to the unknown charge." Id. See supra
notes 165-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Cleveland Newspaper decision.
In such a case, where the Title VII defendant is not put on notice as to which person
nel records are relevant to a particular employment discrimination charge, the defendant is
not provided with the opportunity to avoid the prejudice in making a defense which results
from the delay in providing notice of the charge. Under these circumstances, dismissal of a
plaintiff's claim may be appropriate. As the court emphasized in Cleveland Newspaper,
however, this "is an extreme result, and should be accomplished only when the prejudice to
the defendant can be avoided in no other way." Id. at 1155.
200. Pursuant to authority conferred upon it by 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-8(c) (1982), the
EEOC has promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14, which requires an employer covered by Title
VII to retain aU personnel records for six months after they are created and, when a charge
of discrimination has been filed against the employer, to retain aU records relevant to the
charge until the dispute is resolved. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 provides:
Any personnel or employment record made or kept by an employer ... shaU be
preserved by the employer for a period of 6 months from the date of the making
of the record or the personnel action involved .... Where a charge of discrimina
tion has been filed . . . the respondent employer shaU preserve aU personnel
records relevant to the charge or action until final disposition of the charge or the
action. The term "personnel records relevant to the charge," for example, would
include personnel or employment records relating to the aggrieved person and to
aU other employees holding positions similar to that held or sought by the ag
grieved person and application forms or test papers completed by an unsuccessful
applicant and by aU other candidates for the same position as that for which the
aggrieved person applied and was rejected.
29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1988). See supra note 142 and accompanying text. In addition, both
Title VII itself and the EEOC regulations authorize the EEOC to have "access to," "the
right to copy," and the power to require the production of documents. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e
8(a) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16(a) (1988). Both also authorize the power to require the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence. Id. § 2000e-8, 29
C.F.R. § 1601.16.
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iting the rights of the Title VII plaintiff to an administrative resolution
of claims.
Ellen N. Derrig

